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  1 
Will Ticket Scalpers Meet the Same Fate 
As Spinal Tap Drummers? 
The Sale and Resale of Concert and 
Sports Tickets 
Gregory M. Stein* 
Abstract 
When a concert or sporting event sells out, the performer appears 
popular and the venue enjoys the opportunity to maximize profits from the 
sale of parking, merchandise, food, and beverages.  For these and other 
reasons, event sponsors often underprice tickets.  This underpricing creates 
commercial opportunities for ticket resellers, who purchase in bulk at the 
lower price and resell the tickets at a profit, and also for intermediaries such 
as StubHub.  Legal and technological efforts to squelch ticket resales have 
largely failed, leaving the secondary ticket market stronger than ever. 
This secondary ticket market is economically efficient, but it also creates 
winners and losers.  Ticket resales irritate artists, who believe that greedy 
scalpers are profiting from the artists’ talent, and also trouble some fans, 
who resent the increasingly astronomical prices of resold tickets.  Secondary 
purchasers, by contrast, benefit by obtaining tickets to events they might 
otherwise have missed.  Legislatures have begun to join the discussion, 
though some recent bills have failed in the face of intense industry lobbying.  
These legislative proposals assume that consumers need protection without 
always recognizing that rules that protect some consumers may harm others. 
This Article examines the transferability of event tickets.  It attempts to 
answer several questions: What are the economics of the market in ticket 
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sales and resales?  What, exactly, is a “ticket”?  What property and 
contract rights does the initial ticket holder acquire?  Does the initial ticket 
holder have the legal power to transfer these rights to someone else?  To 
what extent can the initial ticket seller limit that transferability?  Does it 
matter whether the initial purchaser planned to sell at a profit all along?  If 
there is a profit to be made, who is entitled to keep the resale premium? 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Many people who buy tickets to live performances and sporting events 
plan to attend those events.  Others intend to give their tickets to someone 
else, as when a mother buys Justin Bieber tickets for her children or an 
executive gives New England Patriots box seats to a business contact.  Still 
others, pejoratively known as scalpers, obtain tickets with the intention of 
reselling them at a profit. 
Vendors often set initial ticket prices lower than many buyers would be 
willing to pay.1  Sellers want the house to be full and may forego some ticket 
revenue at the outset with the hope of selling parking, food and beverages, 
and merchandise later.2  The low initial price of these tickets often leads to a 
vigorous secondary resale market, with original purchasers reselling tickets 
at a profit and intermediaries receiving commissions for matching buyers 
 
 1. See infra notes 24–29 and accompanying text. 
 2. See infra notes 21–23 and accompanying text. 
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with sellers.3  Efforts by states and by vendors to prevent ticket resales are 
often overwhelmed by market forces.4 
Participants in the entertainment industry have different views about this 
resale market.  Some performers choose to keep ticket prices low so their 
less affluent enthusiasts can attend.5  They are prepared to forego potential 
revenue, they dislike the idea of a house filled only with well-heeled fans, 
and they believe that ticket resellers should not profit from their own 
willingness to sacrifice some income.6  Many fans disagree, are willing and 
able to pay higher prices, and believe that an efficient market should allocate 
tickets to those who pay the most.7  Under this second view, initial 
purchasers are in a position to turn a profit by reselling their underpriced 
tickets.8  Thus, the consumer protection issue has become clouded, with 
consumers on both sides of the argument. 
Moreover, event tickets may not be as freely transferable as the initial 
purchaser thinks.  Many sports teams, performing artists, promoters, venues, 
and ticket sellers such as Ticketmaster prefer for there to be limits on ticket 
transfers.9  Resale agents such as StubHub disagree, believing that an 
original ticket purchaser should enjoy the right to convey her tickets to 
someone else, either gratuitously or for consideration, whether taking a loss 
or earning a profit.10  Ticket consumers are divided on this important issue.11  
This Article examines the economics of ticket resale transactions12 and the 
legal status of the original purchaser who wishes to re-convey her tickets to a 
third party.13 
Part II begins by taking a global look at the economics of the market in 
sales and resales of tickets.  Part III then asks what a ticket is, what legal 
rights it creates under property and contract law, whether those rights are 
transferable, and on what terms.  Part IV examines and compares the roles of 
 
 3. See infra Part II. 
 4. See infra Part IV. 
 5. See infra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra notes 28–29, 56 and accompanying text. 
 7. See infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.   
 9. See infra notes 46–48, 56 and accompanying text.   
 10. See infra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra notes 70–77 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See infra Part III. 
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the private market and the government in transactions involving the sale and 
resale of event tickets.  Finally, Part V looks to the future, suggesting some 
directions the ticket resale market may and should take as technology and 
the law evolve and as the political process continues to function. 
This Article focuses primarily on tickets to sporting events and live 
artistic performances such as concerts and stage plays; it devotes less 
attention to other types of tickets, including tickets to movies or passenger 
tickets on commercial airlines and other common carriers.14  Athletic events 
and live performances differ from movies in that athletes and live performers 
can deliver only a finite number of appearances per year, placing a natural 
limit on overall audience size.15  Movies, by contrast, are easily reproducible 
and can be concurrently displayed at thousands of movie theaters and then 
redisplayed over and over again with little marginal cost.  Thus, one patron’s 
occupancy of a cinema seat does little to reduce access for other patrons.  
And airlines and other common carriers must grapple with security issues 
that provide valid reasons for at least some differences in transferability 
rules.16  Nonetheless, portions of the discussion below may be applicable to 
those types of tickets as well. 
II. THE ECONOMICS OF TICKET RESELLING 
This Part begins by taking an economic perspective and examines the 
financial interests of the issuer of a ticket, the initial purchaser of that ticket, 
and potential third-party transferees.  The goal of this Part is to determine  
what the ideal transferability terms should be in the typical ticketing 
relationship from an economic perspective.  If the parties turn out to be 
legally free to agree to whatever terms they desire, this Part seeks to 
ascertain what terms these parties will choose.17 
 
 14. See infra notes 23, 58, 199–200, 209–10 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra 18–20, 53 and accompanying text. 
 16. See, e.g., infra notes 65, 156 and accompanying text. 
 17. For a thorough review of some of the economic factors that affect the pricing of ticket 
resales, see generally Stephen Happel & Marianne M. Jennings, The Eight Principles of the 
Microeconomic and Regulatory Future of Ticket Scalping, Ticket Brokers, and Secondary Ticket 
Markets, 28 J.L. & COM. 115 (2010), which discusses the economics of the ticket resale market and 
recommends a cure at the national level.  For a useful economic analysis of New York’s previous 
anti-scalping law, see Scott D. Simon, If You Can’t Beat ’Em, Join ’Em: Implications for New York’s 
Scalping Law in Light of Recent Developments in the Ticket Business, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1171 
(2004), which examines New York’s since-repealed anti-scalping law and argues against its 
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A ticket provides entry to a live event such as a Broadway show, a 
musical performance, or a basketball game, or to a common carrier such as a 
commercial airliner.  As with other interests in real estate, much of the value 
of this revocable license is tied to its location, often a specific reserved seat 
within a venue or carrier.  But in this setting, the fourth dimension of that 
location—time —takes on additional significance.  The purchaser not only 
wants to be physically present at a specific latitude, longitude, and altitude 
(Madison Square Garden Section 107, Row 12, Seat 3), but also desires to 
be there at a precise time (when the puck drops).  The slender occupancy 
right that the ticket conveys is limited to a short duration, often just a couple 
of hours.18  A ticket to a live event is “the most perishable commodity on 
earth,”19 and if a ticket holder fails to occupy the designated space at the 
designated time, the ticket’s only remaining value is as a collector’s item.  
Similarly, if the promoter or the venue fails to sell the ticket before the 
curtain rises, the potential sales revenue is gone forever.20  Leases, of course, 
also expire quickly.  But most lease terms are measured in months or years 
rather than hours.  And the occupancy rights leases provide are often for 
more generalized residential or commercial purposes; event tickets, by 
contrast, limit the spectator to spectating and the passenger to passage. 
Conversely, if the seat is occupied, the seller has the opportunity to 
generate further revenue from the occupant.  Broadway theaters sell 
beverages at intermission; music amphitheaters sell T-shirts and CDs in the 
concourse; baseball stadiums sell hot dogs and beer or sushi and Sauvignon 
 
constitutionality. 
 18. My University of Tennessee football season tickets provide me with the right to occupy two 
specific seats seven or eight times each season.  Even though the tickets are quite expensive, I spent 
several years on a waiting list before I was first eligible to purchase them.  Neyland Stadium is used 
for little else during the year, and the occupancy value of those seats at all other times is essentially 
zero.  See, e.g., Facility Rentals, TENN. ATHLETIC HOSPITALITY, http://www.tennesseeathletic 
hospitality.com/facility-rentals/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2014) (allowing the general public to rent only a 
limited number of spaces within Neyland Stadium—none of which include stadium seats—for 
banquets, receptions, and parties). 
 19. DEAN BUDNICK & JOSH BARON, TICKET MASTERS: THE RISE OF THE CONCERT INDUSTRY 
AND HOW THE PUBLIC GOT SCALPED 14 (2011) (quoting Computicket’s Nick Mayo) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 49 (“You can’t sell out a Thursday night ticket on a 
Saturday night, but you sure as hell can sell it ahead of time, and then you can add Wednesday.” 
(quoting Bay Area Seating Service’s Jerry Seltzer) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 20. Some tickets become worthless the moment the event commences, as when a flight attendant 
closes the cabin door.  In other cases, the ticket’s value diminishes rapidly as the event progresses, as 
with a football ticket that is still available after kickoff for sale by the ticket office or resale outside 
the stadium gates. 
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Blanc; and airlines hawk stale peanuts, duty-free cigarettes, and seating 
upgrades.  Sellers collect parking fees before the event, and the local 
community enjoys general economic benefits and increased sales tax 
revenues.  Occupancy of the seat also builds brand allegiance, as the 
satisfied April baseball fan returns during the September pennant race or the 
airline passenger accrues loyalty miles and opportunities for upgrades on 
future flights. 
In some cases, the original ticket may be little more than a loss-leader 
designed to facilitate this secondary consumer spending.21  Jimmy Buffett 
routinely demands and receives an artist fee of 105% of net ticket prices, a 
fee justified by the extremely high alcohol sales generated by Buffett’s loyal 
fans, the Parrot Heads.22  Similarly, in the airline industry, “2012 revenue per 
passenger exceeded costs by a mere 37 cents, according to the Airlines for 
America trade group.  Without $8.49 per passenger in ancillary revenue last 
year, revenue would have been $8.12 lower than per-passenger costs.”23 
Performers, promoters, and venues would rather their events sell out, 
preferably well in advance.  For this reason and others, they often price their 
event tickets below the highest price the market will bear—in fact, Fred 
Rosen, the former Chief Executive Officer of Ticketmaster, has referred to 
concert tickets as “the most underpriced commodity in America.”24  Some 
performers simply want to rest easy and not have to worry about possible 
 
 21. See, e.g., Annelena Lobb, Why Does That Popcorn Cost So Much?, CNNMONEY (Mar. 12, 
2002, 2:07 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2002/03/08/smbusiness/q_movies/ (discussing movie 
theaters’ dependence on concession sales, rather than sales of theater tickets, to generate profit). 
 22. BUDNICK & BARON, supra note 19, at 181.  Other acts known for huge alcohol sales, 
including the Allman Brothers Band, Lynyrd Skynyrd, and Tom Petty, demand similar artist fees.  
Id. 
 23. Susan Carey, Airline Fees Keep Climbing, WALL ST. J., July 4, 2013, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323689204578569653054627258.html; see also 
Scott McCartney, For Travelers, This Summer’s New Fee on Airline Tickets, WALL ST. J., July 2, 
2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/for-travelers-this-summers-new-fee-on-airline-tickets-14043416 
06?mod=WSJ_hp_EditorsPicks (“The airline strategy has been to move . . . costs out of the ticket 
price so travelers can be enticed with low fares and then hit with additional costs at the airport.”). 
 24. BUDNICK & BARON, supra note 19, at 73 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Pascal 
Courty, Some Economics of Ticket Resale, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 85 (2003) (exploring some possible 
explanations for the initial underpricing of event tickets); Joe Nocera, Internet Puts a Sugarcoat on 
Scalping, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/19/technology/19nocera. 
html?_r=0&sq=nocera&adxnnl=1&scp=3&pagewanted=all&adxnnlx=1415203419-S2/n8CyQ46bu 
XhlYue6YhA (“If tickets for tomorrow’s game are worth $1,000 rather [than] $100, what’s to stop 
the N.F.L. from selling the ticket for that much in the first place?  Economic rationality stinks, 
doesn’t it?”). 
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empty seats, even though they might have increased their total revenue by 
selling the tickets at a higher price, if more slowly.  Others like to crow 
about how quickly their events sell out, with lower prices presumably 
leading to faster sales.  Still others may wish to build a loyal fan base, 
underpricing tickets now in the hope that today’s halfhearted fan will 
become hooked and willing to pay more for tickets later on.25  Event 
planners may believe that those attending an event will enjoy it more if the 
house is full, to the point that they may even “paper the house” by giving 
away remaining unsold tickets at the last minute.  The performer does not 
always see eye-to-eye with the promoter or the venue, and pricing is 
sometimes an issue that the parties must negotiate.26  And proceeds from 
tickets sold in advance can be held and invested until those funds must be 
paid over to the artist, promoter, or venue.27 
Some performers may be reluctant to be the first to raise ticket prices 
dramatically and thus depart from the prevalent pricing model, perhaps out 
of fear of being perceived as greedy.28  Low ticket prices are sometimes a 
calculated public relations move, as when Kid Rock announced that nearly 
 
 25. See Adam Davidson, How Much Is Michael Bolton Worth to You?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 
4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/09/magazine/the-secret-science-of-scalping-tickets.html? 
pagewanted=all&_r=0 (contrasting artists such as Michael Bolton and Barbra Streisand, who price 
their tickets near the equilibrium price, with Bruce Springsteen and Pearl Jam, who charge well 
below market value, and suggesting that performers in the latter group make up the difference in 
sales of ancillary merchandise while also fostering greater fan loyalty and repeat business). 
 26. An extreme example of this phenomenon is seen in the recent reunion tour of 1990s band 
Rocket from the Crypt.  Ryan Dezember, For Fans of Rocket from the Crypt, a Tattoo Was Once 
Just the Ticket, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/news/article_email/SB10001424052 
702304181204579367061727935826-lMyQjAxMTA0MDAwODEwNDgyWj.  During its heyday, 
the band announced that any fan sporting a tattoo of the band’s logo would receive free admission to 
all future concerts.  Id.  On the current reunion tour, promoters have been reluctant to honor the 
band’s twenty-year-old promise.  Id. (referring to one band member as “both befuddled and flattered 
by the number of fans who have its tattoo,” while noting how difficult it is to get venues to honor the 
band’s earlier commitment). 
 27. See, e.g., Joe Vardon, Legislator’s Plan Links College Football Tickets, Food Banks, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 24, 2013, http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2013/09/24/ 
plan-links-football-food-banks.html (discussing how annual season ticket sales for Ohio State 
football games earned interest of approximately $25,000 in the five months between the last sale 
date and the first game). 
 28. See, e.g., Alan B. Krueger, Chairman, Council of Econ. Advisers, Land of Hope and Dreams: 
Rock and Roll, Economics and Rebuilding the Middle Class (June 12, 2013), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/hope_and_dreams_-_final.pdf (“[M]any artists 
have been reluctant to raise prices to what the market will bear for fear of garnering a reputation of 
gouging their fans.”). 
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all tickets for his recent tour would be priced at twenty dollars.29  And in 
other cases, as just noted, the ticket price is set at a low level in the hope that 
the patron will spend additional money buying drinks or checking luggage.  
Headliners thus have a variety of reasons for selling their tickets at less than 
the equilibrium price that the laws of supply and demand would otherwise 
dictate.  They intentionally underprice their tickets and choose to forego 
some potential ticket revenue, usually receiving some other benefit in return.  
Ticket resellers such as StubHub would not survive for long if this were not 
the case. 
Note as well that not every artist who claims to be selling performance 
tickets at a discounted price is being completely candid.  Some performers 
have maintained that they are pricing their tickets at a bargain rate while 
actually making only a small percentage of their tickets available to the 
public at that price.  For example, some artists open ticket sales to members 
of their fan club before the less costly tickets officially go on sale, an 
approach that has had the odd side effect of causing many would-be scalpers 
to join the Justin Bieber fan club.30  Others run pre-sale promotions with 
credit card companies or other sponsors, sometimes bundling their tickets 
with pricier add-ons such as backstage passes and opportunities to meet the 
performers.31  These practices may leave few tickets available to the public 
on the day tickets officially become available at the discounted price.32  
 
 29. Andy Greene, Kid Rock on His $20 Tour and ‘Dumbass Republicans,’ ROLLING STONE, Apr. 
10, 2013, http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/kid-rock-on-his-20-tour-and-dumbass-republican 
s-20130410 (“Shouldn’t we all take less and pass some of that money onto others?  Think about 
firefighters, teachers and policemen.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The artist also criticized 
Ticketmaster for charging a five-dollar service charge and announced that some Wal-Mart stores 
would sell the tickets without a service charge and would include parking.  Id.; see also Ray 
Waddell, Kid Rock Takes ‘Pay Cut’ With $20 Tickets on Summer Tour, BILLBOARD, Apr. 8, 2013, 
http://www.billboard.com/articles/news/1556609/kid-rock-takes-pay-cut-with-20-tickets-on-summer 
-tour (noting that beers would sell for four dollars, some merchandise would be available for twenty 
dollars, and 1,000 tickets per performance would be set aside to be sold at the higher market rate). 
 30. See, e.g., Jeffrey Lee Puckett, Buying Concert Tickets for Louisville Shows Getting More 
Complicated, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Dec. 31, 2012, http://www.courier-
journal.com/article/20121231/SCENE04/312310044/Buying-concert-tickets-Louisville-shows-gettin 
g-more-complicated (discussing practices of artists who offer special deals on concert tickets to 
members of their fan clubs, holders of certain credit cards, and other persons several days before the 
general public sale date). 
 31. Id. 
 32. See, e.g., Phil Williams, Documents Show ‘Bieber Is Scalping His Own Tickets,’ 
NEWSCHANNEL5.COM (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.jrn.com/newschannel5/news/newschannel-5-
investigates/249382491.html (explaining that only 1,001 of nearly 14,000 seats for a Justin Bieber 
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Some artists have even been accused of holding back some of their own low-
priced tickets and then scalping those tickets themselves at the market rate.33 
More recently, a few performers have seemed willing to charge what 
they believe to be a market-clearing price, even if that higher price means 
slower ticket sales and bad press.  The Rolling Stones may have gone a bit 
too far in that direction on their recent “50 and Counting” tour,34 with a top 
ticket price of six hundred dollars.35  While some tickets had to be marked 
down as concert dates approached,36 suggesting that the Stones may have 
 
concert in Nashville were available when tickets became generally available to the public; only 
1,600 for a Taylor Swift concert three years earlier; only 389 for a Keith Urban concert that same 
year). 
 33. See, e.g., id. (noting that tickets reserved for Justin Bieber’s tour were later available at the 
website of ticket reseller TicketsNow); Puckett, supra note 30 (describing criticism of Lady Gaga 
and Justin Bieber for scalping their own tickets, while noting that the practice is not illegal).  
Alternatively, artists or primary sellers may illegally steer blocks of tickets directly to ticket resellers 
in exchange for a kickback.  Happel & Jennings, supra note 17, at 155–56; Mesfin Fekadu, Kid Rock 
& Rolling Stones on Scalping, Summer Tours, HUFFINGTON POST (May 24, 2013, 10:24 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/24/kid-rock-rolling-stones-scalping_n_3331427.html (quot-
ing Kid Rock as saying, “I’ve had people in the scalping business come at me already and try to 
make side deals like, ‘I can make you thousands of dollars, hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash 
if you’ll just flip a few of these tickets our way for certain shows,’” while acknowledging that he 
may have scalped his own tickets in the past (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 34. Rafi Mohammed, Ain’t Too Proud to Beg: Pricing Lessons from the Rolling Stones, HARV. 
BUS. REV. HBR BLOG NETWORK (May 14, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2013/05/aint_ 
too_proud_to_beg_pricing.html (describing promoters as “on the verge of a ‘19th Nervous 
Breakdown’” and concluding, “[q]uite simply, sometimes you overshoot”). 
 35. Ray Waddell, Rolling Stones Concert Promoter on ‘Flex Pricing’ Ticket Strategy: ‘I Want 
the Brokers Pissed Off,’ BILLBOARD, May 7, 2013, http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/ 
touring/1560750/rolling-stones-concert-promoter-on-flex-pricing-ticket-strategy-i (describing the 
Stones’ dynamic pricing strategy as designed to maximize profit while minimizing the premiums 
available to scalpers). 
 36. Mark Guarino, Pricey Tickets for Rolling Stones Tour Test Limits of Live-Concert Market, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 3, 2013, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2013/0603/Pricey-tickets-
for-Rolling-Stones-tour-test-limits-of-live-concert-market (describing “last-minute price-cutting to 
fill the hall”); Sue Zeidler, Rolling Stones Rock Packed House After Price Cuts in LA, REUTERS, 
May 4, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/04/entertainment-us-rollingstones-
idUSBRE94304H20130504 (“Days before the show, hundreds of seats were still available and 
secondary sellers scrambled to unload tickets by slashing prices from the original $250 to $600 price 
range which had irked many of even the most die-hard Stones fans.”).  In an effort to render these 
last-minute seats as undesirable as possible and thereby placate those purchasers who had paid 
considerably more while making an earlier financial commitment, the promoter made fans seeking 
the less costly seats wait outside the arena and advised them that the seats they received at the 
discounted price might be located anywhere in the venue.  Sue Zeidler, Rolling Stones Tickets 
Slashed in Price for Los Angeles Show, HUFFINGTON POST (May 4, 2013, 6:19 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/04/rolling-stones-tickets-price-los-angeles_n_3213878.html 
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aimed a bit too high, nearly all seats on the tour seem to have sold,37 and the 
band’s gross for its eighteen U.S. performances was expected to approach 
$100 million.38 
Rolling Stones fans may be older and more affluent than those who 
attend performances by other acts and thus not as price-sensitive, and these 
aging rockers may see less need than other, younger acts to preserve fans’ 
good will for future tours.39  But the Rolling Stones are not the only act to 
have increased ticket prices dramatically in recent years, with tickets for 
artists such as Justin Timberlake and Jay-Z (appearing together) and Kenny 
Chesney topping out at over two hundred dollars.40  These artists seem to be 
willing to sweat out slow sales early in an effort to maximize total ticket 
revenue in the long run.  For artists such as the Stones, the total revenue 
number seems to matter more than the speed with which they can sell out 
large arenas.  As a result, the box-office price for tickets to their shows is 
higher.  Indeed, ticket prices for concerts by the top artists have increased 
much faster than the inflation rate in recent years, and the most popular 
headliners are taking home a larger percentage of overall spending on 
concert tickets.41 
The phenomenon of higher ticket prices reflects the changing nature of 
the music business.  Twenty or thirty years ago, performers made much of 
their money from record or compact disc sales, with the tours serving as 
 
(quoting one fan as saying, “It’s very thrilling.  It’s like gambling and the Stones all rolled into one.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 37. Guarino, supra note 36 (describing ticket sales as “robust”). 
 38. Waddell, supra note 35.  The final take was actually higher, as the eighteen performances to 
which the author refers do not include additional shows in Europe and Canada.  See generally 14 on 
Fire, ROLLING STONES, http://www.rollingstones.com/tickets/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2014) (listing “50 
and Counting” tour locations in Canada, France, and the United Kingdom). 
 39. But see Mohammed, supra note 34 (discussing potential reputational damage to the Stones’ 
well-established brand and concluding, “[i]t’s a shame that due to poor pricing decisions, the Rolling 
Stones are closing out their career amidst allegations of greed, headlines reporting on poor sales, and 
the taint of desperation from employing tacky discounting methods”). 
 40. Brian McCollum, Kid Rock Announces Detroit Concert Dates for Summer Tour, Rolls Dice 
with New Pricing Scheme, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Apr. 8, 2013, http://www.freep.com/article/201304 
08/ENT04/130408008/Kid%20Rock%20announces%20Detroit%20concert%20dates,%20rolls%20d
ice%20with%20new%20pricing%20scheme (contrasting Kid Rock’s reduced prices with much 
higher fees charged by other artists). 
 41. Krueger, supra note 28, at 1 (noting that “[t]he price of the average concert ticket increased 
by nearly 400% from 1981 to 2012, much faster than the 150% rise in overall consumer price 
inflation” and that “[t]he top 5 percent [of performers] take home almost 90 percent of all concert 
revenues”).  Krueger also presents this information in graphic form.  Id. at 16–17. 
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raucous advertisements for the pre-recorded music.42  Today, music sales 
have largely moved to online portals such as iTunes, and it is much easier 
for fans to acquire music illegally.43  This means that performers today are 
more likely to see sales of songs as an opportunity to entice fans to attend 
concerts, where these fans will spend more than they used to on the price of 
admission, not to mention $50 for T-shirts and $12 for beers during the 
show.44  Concerts also provide entertainers with their best chance to establish 
a personal rapport with their audience.45 
Moreover, at least some artists—along with many venues and 
promoters—correctly recognize that higher initial ticket prices reduce the 
opportunities for scalpers to benefit from ticket resales.46  Advances in 
technology have made it easier to resell event tickets, and some artists resent 
online ticket resellers such as StubHub more than they worried about 
traditional scalpers twenty years ago.  Online ticket resellers can operate 
efficiently, rapidly, and in huge volume, and certainly more so than the 
grizzled scalper standing outside the arena barking, “Who needs tickets?”  
Moreover, that grizzled scalper had to take the legal and business gamble of 
actually buying the tickets—laying out the money and risking being unable 
to resell them—while StubHub merely functions as an intermediary.47  
 
 42. See Adrian Covert, A Decade of iTunes Singles Killed the Music Industry, CNNMONEY (Apr. 
25, 2013, 6:09 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/04/25/technology/itunes-music-decline. 
 43. See David Goldman, Music’s Lost Decade: Sales Cut in Half, CNNMONEY (Feb. 3, 2010, 
9:52 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/02/news/companies/napster_music_industry/. 
 44. See Krueger, supra note 28, at 3 (“While concerts used to be a loss leader to sell albums, 
today concerts are a profit center.”); Randy Lewis, Bon Jovi Dominates Pollstar’s Concert Tour List, 
L.A. TIMES POP & HISS (Dec. 31, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/music/ 
posts/la-et-ms-2013-top-concert-tours-bon-jovi-20131231,0,2366828.story#axzz2srjonJW4 (listing 
top ten artists ranked by worldwide concert ticket sales in 2013, and noting that “[t]he dip the 
concert business took in 2009—which caused concern that the live music business was following the 
record industry into the financial doldrums—appears to have been a short-term setback”). 
 45. X.M. FRASCOGNA, JR., SHAWNASSEY B. HOWELL & H. LEE HETHERINGTON, 
ENTERTAINMENT LAW FOR THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER 67 (2011) (“The magic of performing live 
is the backbone of an artist’s career.  Live performances give an artist and audience a chance to 
connect with each other.”). 
 46. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 25. 
 47. See, e.g., Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 561 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (granting summary 
judgment in favor of StubHub in suit alleging that StubHub violated North Carolina’s anti-scalping 
law, on the grounds that StubHub is immune under the federal Communications Decency Act, 47 
U.S.C. § 230 (2006), because the ticket seller and not StubHub provided the published content that 
allegedly violated the statute); Weinstein v. eBay, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 2d 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(similar result under New York state law).  But see NPS LLC v. StubHub, Inc., No. 06-4874-BLS1, 
2009 WL 995483, at *12–13 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 26, 2009) (denying ticket reseller’s motion for 
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Those who wish to undercut this flourishing market may simply elect to set 
ticket prices higher at the outset.48 
Even with some headliners moving toward market-priced tickets, it is 
apparent that tickets for many performances are still underpriced.  In other 
words, some prospective patrons would willingly pay far more than the list 
price to attend many live events.  This has always been true, which explains 
why scalpers have existed for generations, even when resales are prohibited 
by law or by the terms of the original license.  But recent technological 
changes have made the process of reselling tickets easier, quicker, and safer.  
Unless there is some practical and effective method for limiting resales, a 
secondary market in performance tickets will persist.  This resale market 
allows the initial ticket holder to profit by transferring the ticket to someone 
who values it more highly, it offers fans who could not obtain tickets from 
the box office another opportunity to gain admission to the show at a price 
they are willing to pay, and it provides arbitrageurs such as StubHub the 
occasion to charge fees for their matchmaking services.49 
Price controls are notoriously ineffective in the long run, as markets 
develop in which the initial holder of a right transfers that right, sometimes 
illegally, to a secondary purchaser who values it more highly.50  When this 
happens, part of the sales price that the ultimate purchaser pays accrues to 
the initial purchaser of the right (the first ticket holder), who is in a position 
to resell at a profit, rather than to the “creator” of the right (the artist or 
promoter).  This phenomenon is seen in other controlled markets.  When a 
 
partial summary judgment and rejecting its § 230 immunity defense because reseller also provided 
information content). 
 48. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 25. 
 49. The resale transaction also raises knotty sales tax questions, as the second sale may be 
structured in a way that makes it difficult or impossible for a taxing jurisdiction to collect sales tax 
on the resale premium.  See, e.g., City of Chi. v. StubHub, Inc., 979 N.E.2d 844, 845, 857 (Ill. 2012) 
(holding, upon certification of question from Seventh Circuit to Illinois Supreme Court, that 
Illinois’s home rule provisions do not require StubHub to collect the City of Chicago’s sales taxes on 
ticket resale transactions).  Thus, if the initial ticket price is set at the market rate, the city will collect 
sales tax on the entire price, but if the ticket is initially sold at a lower price and then resold at the 
market rate, the city will probably be able to collect sales tax on only the first of these two 
transactions.  See id. at 855.  Similarly, those who purchase tickets at face value and then resell them 
at a higher price on the secondary market may—inappropriately—fail to report their gains from the 
second transaction as income. 
 50. See, e.g., Eric Felten, Don’t Blame a Scalper When You Think You’ve Been Fleeced, WALL 
ST. J., Apr. 8, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704013604576248923513245 
308. 
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rent-controlled tenant sublets his apartment illegally, for example, the 
subtenant is paying rent of at least the market rate.51  But a portion of that 
higher sublease rent—the difference between the sublease rent and the 
leasehold rent, minus any transaction costs such as brokerage commissions 
or bribes—accrues to the initial tenant rather than to the landlord.52  
Similarly, the purchaser of a scalped ticket pays whatever price the laws of 
supply and demand dictate.  But only the list price for the ticket accrues to 
the artist and promoter, with the resale profit flowing to the initial purchaser 
of the event ticket along with any intermediaries. 
As a result, there are only two possible outcomes when initial ticket 
prices are set below the market price.  One possibility is that the tickets are 
freely transferable both at law and by their own terms.  Demand at the too-
low price will exceed supply.  Because supply is inherently limited in the 
case of a live performance—the performer can perform only so many times 
 
 51. The term “market rate” is somewhat difficult to define if prices in the market are controlled.  
If the law artificially depresses prices, demand is higher than it otherwise would be.  At the same 
time, the price control discourages investors from providing adequate supplies of the good.  Demand 
increases while supply decreases and an artificial shortage develops, so it is difficult to ascertain 
what the price would have been in the absence of controls.  New York City’s experience with rent 
control demonstrates that many existing landlords sought to convert their rental units to 
condominium or cooperative ownership, which was not subject to price controls, while potential new 
developers were discouraged from entering the residential rental market because of the cap on 
rentals.  See, e.g., William Tucker, How Rent Control Drives Out Affordable Housing, CATO INST. 
(May 21, 1997), http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-274.html.  This led to a significant shortage of 
rental units.  Id.  The principal beneficiary of this system was the initial tenant—in effect, an 
apartment scalper—who was in a position to sublet the apartment at a significant profit. 
 52. New York’s rent-control law tries to address this problem by placing limits on subleasing.  
See, e.g., N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8630-a (McKinney, Westlaw through 2014 legislation) (limiting 
sublease surcharges to ten percent and permitting even these only if the unit is rented furnished, 
limiting subleases to two years of every four, and imposing other restrictions).  But market pressure 
is often more powerful than state law, with primary tenants seeking to evade these limits by charging 
“key money” and other illegal fees to their subtenants.  See, e.g., Fact Sheet: #7 Sublets, 
Assignments and Illusory Tenancies, N.Y. STATE DIV. OF HOUS. & CMTY. RENEWAL 1, 
http://www.nyshcr.org/Rent/FactSheets/orafac7.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2014) (noting that “[t]he 
prime tenant may not demand ‘key money’ or overcharge the subtenant” and emphasizing that 
violations can lead to treble damages). 
  Commercial landlords have devised numerous ways of recapturing some of the profit that 
may arise when the rent they charge their tenants turns out to have been too low, such as by 
including provisions in the lease that permit the landlord to recapture a portion of any sublease 
profit.  This approach has not historically been feasible in the market for event tickets, although 
technological developments may be changing that.  For example, Ticketmaster’s purchase of reseller 
TicketsNow suggests that the former may be seeking to jump on the StubHub bandwagon.  See infra 
notes 76–77 and accompanying text. 
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per year, and each venue can hold only so many people—the price for the 
ticket will rise until demand is equal to that supply.  Initial purchasers who 
value their tickets less will transfer their tickets to others who value them 
more until the price reaches equilibrium.53  The ultimate attendee will pay a 
price that is higher than the list price, and intermediaries who facilitate the 
exchange will earn commissions for their services. 
The other possibility is that the tickets are not freely transferable, due to 
legal or technological restrictions or the terms of the ticket itself.  The 
government, the artist, or the venue, in effect, imposes price controls.  
Demand will continue to outstrip supply at the initial, low price, but the 
initial purchaser will be unable to transfer her license.54  If this limit on 
transfers is effective in practice, the lucky few who obtain tickets at the low 
price will enjoy the performance, while others will be unable to attend even 
though they were willing to pay more for the ticket than the actual attendees 
paid.  This result is inefficient, in that some of the attendees would have 
preferred to give up the experience in exchange for the profit a resale would 
have generated, while some frustrated fans were willing to pay more than list 
price to attend an event that they ended up missing.  Conversely, if this limit 
cannot be enforced in practice, then a black market will develop: The tickets 
will be transferred, even though such transfers were not supposed to occur, 
and the discussion in the prior paragraph will apply.  Now, though, some of 
the profit that might otherwise accrue to the reseller will need to be spent to 
circumvent the legal, technological, and contractual restrictions on transfer.55 
 
 53. For an interesting study ranking the strength of Southeastern Conference football rivalries 
based on the prices fans are willing to pay for tickets on the secondary market, see Ken Sanford & 
Frank Scott, Assessing the Intensity of Sports Rivalries Using Data from Secondary Market 
Transactions (Jan. 29, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=23876 
22&download=yes. 
 54. See infra Part III.  Prohibitions on transfer need not be established by laws and regulations.  
For selected shows, Ticketmaster sells “paperless tickets” that can be used only by their initial 
purchasers.  See infra notes 145–161 and accompanying text.  Thus, technological advances may 
succeed in limiting the ticket resale market in settings where legal restrictions have been difficult to 
enforce. 
 55. See, e.g., HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD 
WORLD 152–72 (1989).  If the restriction is a legal one, the transferor and any intermediaries may 
need to spend some of the ticket premium to avoid detection or circumvent the legal rules, such as 
by paying bribes, fines, and retainers to defense lawyers.  These expenses become costs of doing 
business.  See, e.g., id. (describing losses caused by the illegality of informal economic activity in 
Peru).  If the restriction is a practical or technological one, as with paperless tickets, then money 
must be spent on eluding whatever limitations the initial seller has imposed, perhaps by developing 
software that frustrates the original seller’s resale prohibitions.  See, e.g., infra notes 169, 178 and 
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Many artists and promoters are disturbed by the thought that scalpers are 
making money they believe to be rightfully their own.  In their view, ticket 
proceeds should accrue to the talented artist who is toiling on stage and not 
to a shady-looking character standing outside the arena with a fistful of 
tickets and a large wad of cash.56  The most effective solution to this 
problem is for the artists to charge higher prices, as noted above.  If the 
ticket is priced at the market rate, then only those who value the ticket at this 
price will purchase it, total box-office sales revenues will be higher, all of 
the sale proceeds will flow to the artist and promoter rather than to 
intermediaries, and resales will occur only for convenience and not for 
profit.  Some transfers will still occur, such as by those ticket holders who 
discover that they cannot attend the event, but the transfer price will not 
exceed the list price.  Some artists are unwilling to price their tickets this 
high out of concern that they will be perceived as avaricious, as discussed 
above.  But there are other sensible economic reasons why some artists, 
venues, and promoters still may elect to set initial ticket prices below the 
market price. 
To begin with, at the time artists or sports teams set their prices, they 
may not know for sure what the market price actually will be when the event 
occurs.  They may overestimate their own popularity, or, in the words of 
Spinal Tap’s manager, Ian Faith, “their appeal [may become] more 
selective.”57  Saturday tickets may sell more vigorously than Tuesday tickets, 
and games against the Red Sox may be easier to sell than games against the 
Brewers.  Some performances may conflict with other popular events, 
including events that are scheduled after their own tickets go on sale.  Floor 
seats will be more desirable than seats in the second concourse, and the artist 
 
accompanying text (discussing ticket bots that allow scalpers to purchase more tickets than the seller 
intended to permit). 
 56. See, e.g., Happel & Jennings, supra note 17, at 180 (discussing the resentment those in the 
live theater industry feel toward scalpers, who make no artistic contribution to the performance); see 
also Felten, supra note 50 (“So why does the stigma persist?  Perhaps it is just a visceral reaction—
buzzards and hyenas, after all, are an essential part of the food chain, but that doesn’t make them any 
more attractive to us.”). 
 57. THIS IS SPINAL TAP (Spinal Tap Prods. 1984).  In fact, legalized reselling provides initial 
sellers with additional information that allows them to set the initial price at a level closer to what 
the market is willing to pay.  Brett Goldberg, Guest Commentary: The Future of Ticket Scalping 
Laws, TICKETNEWS (Apr. 17, 2013, 2:36 PM), http://www.ticketnews.com/features/Guest-
Commentary-The-Future-of-Ticket-Scalping-Laws-4-17-13-098 (“[T]he legalization of for-profit 
reselling has actually benefitted primary sellers, by allowing them to see what fans are willing to pay 
and to price accordingly.”). 
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may have difficulty assessing the relative prices of these tickets in advance.  
Good or bad reviews in the press or on social media early in a tour, or good 
or bad play by an athletic team early in a season, may affect demand for later 
dates. 
Airlines (and, to a lesser extent, hotels) have learned to address these 
uncertainties by pricing their seats dynamically, developing sophisticated 
computer algorithms that continuously re-set fares as new information 
becomes available.58  Dynamic pricing has appeared in other, less expected 
settings.  The City of San Francisco prices on-street parking dynamically.59  
This has led several software developers to create smartphone apps that 
allow for the resale of parking spaces at a profit—essentially, the scalping of 
public parking spots—a practice that San Francisco is challenging.60  The 
high-end Chicago restaurant Alinea presells seats through its webpage, with 
prices varying by date and time.61  This model allows the restaurant to 
reduce revenue uncertainty by collecting the cost of the prix fixe meal, sales 
tax, and a 20% service charge at the time of the advance booking.62  The 
restaurant enjoys the float on these prepaid amounts, while the patron is 
more likely to have forgotten her high sunk costs for the food when she is 
presented with the beverage menu on the night of the meal.  These prepaid 
tickets can be resold, but the restaurant encourages resales through its own 
website and discourages resales at greater than face value.63  And food prices 
 
 58. See, e.g., Suemedha Sood, How Airline Pricing Works, BBC.COM (Apr. 5, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.com/travel/blog/20130405-how-airline-pricing-works (discussing airline pricing 
strategies); Gabor Forgacs, Revenue Management: Dynamic Pricing, HOSPITALITY NET (Jan. 19, 
2010), http://www.hospitalitynet.org/news/4045046.html (describing dynamic pricing for hotels). 
 59. Pricing, SFPARK, http://sfpark.org/how-it-works/pricing/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2014) 
(describing the city’s “demand-responsive pricing [which aims] to open up parking spaces on each 
block and reduce circling and double-parking”).   
 60. Laura Entis, San Francisco Says Enough Monkey Business: Tells Parking Spot App to Shut 
Down, ENTREPRENEUR, July 11, 2014, http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/235575 (describing how 
“MonkeyParking, an app that allows drivers to post their soon-to-be-vacated spots online and 
auction them off to the highest bidder,” ceased operations after San Francisco served it with a cease-
and-desist letter). 
 61. Reservations, ALINEA RESTAURANT, https://tickets.alinearestaurant.com/slots/find (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2014) (“Pricing varies by time and day of week, just as a ticket would for different 
seats in a theater or sporting event.”). 
 62. Frequently Asked Questions, ALINEA RESTAURANT, https://tickets.alinearestaurant.com/web 
site/faq (last visited Oct. 6, 2014). 
 63. Id.  At one point, Alinea and its sister restaurant, Next, threatened to void scalped restaurant 
tickets.  Prepaid Dinner Reservations: Meet the Scalpers, RESTAURANT HOSPITALITY (July 22, 
2011), http://restaurant-hospitality.com/trends/meet-the-scalpers-0711.  This placed the owners in 
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in the Goldman Sachs cafeteria are discounted by 25% before 11:30 a.m. 
and after 1:30 p.m.,64 a practice that differs little from creating a discounted 
happy hour, early-bird dinner, or pre-theater menu.  Performers and sports 
teams, however, have been slow to adopt this model.65 
Even if artists can accurately assess the value of their own tickets ahead 
of time, advance sales operate like a futures market, reducing risk, reducing 
overall revenue, and providing greater certainty.  The purchaser pays a lower 
price today for the right to attend an event weeks or months in the future, 
giving up cash immediately without knowing how the value of that ticket 
will fluctuate between the purchase date and the event date.  The artist that 
 
the enforcement business, facing questions such as whether to cancel Alinea tickets that had been 
traded for hockey or football seats.  Id. (referring to “the Wild West ticket aftermarket their system 
ha[d] inadvertently created”).  Nonetheless, seating requests regularly outstrip supply, and the 
restaurant’s website sometimes crashes under high patron demand.  Id.; see also Jesse McKinley, 
Bidding Frenzy for Tickets to Eat at Next in Chicago, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/09/us/09next.html?_r=0 (“Prices also vary by night, and demand, 
something . . . [chef and co-owner Grant] Achatz likens to airline pricing (though certainly not to 
airline food).”); Marty Lariviere, The Next Big Thing: Scalping Restaurant Seats, OPERATIONS 
ROOM (Apr. 13, 2011), http://operationsroom.wordpress.com/2011/04/13/scalping-restaurant-seats/ 
(discussing online ticket sales for Next).  See generally Should Restaurant Reservations Be for 
Sale?, N.Y. TIMES ROOM FOR DEBATE (June 18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/201 
4/06/18/should-restaurant-reservations-be-for-sale?WT.mc_id=NYT-E-I-NYT-E-AT-0625-L11&_r 
=0&nl=el&nlid=572313 (collecting columns from authors with differing views). 
 64. Neil Irwin, All Restaurants Should Copy the Goldman Sachs Cafeteria’s Genius Pricing 
Plan, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Oct. 18, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/w 
p/2013/10/18/all-restaurants-should-copy-the-goldman-sachs-cafeterias-genius-pricing-plan/ (noting 
that “[r]estaurateurs tend to see success when their place is so full that nobody else can get in the 
door.  In fact, that’s a massive market failure,” and suggesting that restaurants should raise prices at 
peak hours). 
 65. This reluctance to adopt dynamic pricing may reflect the fact that airline tickets are 
nontransferable while most event tickets can easily be resold.  Thus the box office, unlike the 
airlines, faces unpredictable amounts of competition from early purchasers who are reselling their 
own seats.  For that matter, traditional scalpers generally price their tickets dynamically, with 
charges fluctuating based on evolving supply and demand information right up until the event 
begins, and sometimes for a short time afterwards. 
  To be sure, there are some well-established examples of dynamic pricing by performance 
venues, notably the TKTS booth in New York’s Times Square that sells reduced-price same-day 
tickets to Broadway and Off-Broadway shows.  See TKTS Discount Booths, TDF, 
https://www.tdf.org/nyc/7/TKTS-ticket-booths (last visited Oct. 6, 2014).  These tickets, though, are 
sold at a steep discount just before they are about to go unused.  See id.; Goldberg, supra note 57 
(discussing the TKTS booth and asking, “If the law allows for the market to accept a decrease in 
prices, why not an increase?  If primary ticket sellers are allowed to profit from tickets that are 
initially overpriced, why can’t secondary sellers profit from tickets that are initially underpriced?”).  
Airline tickets, by contrast, fluctuate wildly in price, and these changes occur many times over a 
period of several months. 
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underprices her tickets can relax and enjoy more enthusiastic sales without 
having to worry about the slower sales that higher prices would have caused, 
even though total revenues may be lower than they otherwise could have 
been. This is particularly important if the performer’s contract with the 
venue requires her to meet certain sales milestones as the event date 
approaches, as she is more likely to hit these targets the lower she prices her 
tickets.  In return for setting the price below the market maximum, the artist, 
the promoter, and the venue can all enjoy the comfort of knowing early on 
that the tickets are moving.  The initial sale of the tickets is, in effect, an IPO 
that is fully subscribed, with the initial purchasers then able to resell their 
“shares” to willing buyers. 
Selling tickets below the equilibrium price thus functions as a form of 
insurance, one that leads to higher early ticket sales but at a relatively low 
price.  This approach may be particularly important for sports teams, which 
can sell more tickets to fans when preseason hopes are high, fully aware that 
those fans may become less excited about purchasing tickets once the reality 
of another mediocre season sets in.66  Some artists appear to be happy to 
boast about how quickly they sell out their dates, even though speedy sales 
are indicative of setting the charge too low.  This type of underpricing also 
buttresses fan loyalty, while the fact that the event sold out and tickets are 
available only on the resale market amplifies the buzz surrounding the event. 
To the extent that ticket prices are initially set too low, ticket resales are 
economically efficient.  In a setting in which underpriced tickets are resold 
once or more, the artist is not the only person who deserves to be 
compensated.  Unlike the artist or the promoter, the initial purchaser is 
willing to assume the risk that prices will drop in exchange for the prospect 
that prices will rise.  That, in fact, is the scalper’s business model.  
Moreover, if an intermediary such as StubHub helps to ensure that the event 
ticket ends up in the hands of the fan who is willing to pay the most for it, 
that middleman plays an important role and is entitled to compensation 
 
 66. In fact, some athletic teams strongly support ticket resales and encourage these secondary 
transfers directly from their webpage.  See, e.g., Tennessee Athletics Ticket Office, UTSPORTS.COM, 
http://www.utsports.com/tickets/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2014) (noting that “StubHub is the exclusive 
fan-to-fan ticket marketplace of [University of] Tennessee Athletics” and including a link).  These 
teams presumably believe fans are more likely to take the plunge on season tickets if they know 
from the outset that they will easily be able to transfer tickets to the games they cannot attend.  See 
generally Danielle Moore, Note, The Times They Are A Changing: Secondary Ticket Market Moves 
from Taboo to Mainstream, 11 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 295, 301–02 (2010) (examining the 
active participation of sports teams in the secondary ticket market). 
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every bit as much as a real estate agent or a travel agent.67  Ticket prices are 
set too low at the outset in return for the security of knowing early on that 
tickets sales will be more robust.  The original purchaser bears financial 
risk—precisely the risk the artist was happy to relinquish by underpricing 
the ticket initially—in return for possible financial reward.  The intermediary 
serves as a repository of information and helps to ensure that the ticket 
ultimately finds its way to the spectator who values it most.  The first 
purchaser and the intermediary combine to provide a type of insurance to the 
artist and split the resale differential as a premium. 
The initial purchaser and any middlemen are not the only service 
providers to be compensated during the course of producing an artistic or 
athletic event.  Other parties perform various roles in the production process, 
offering different goods and services and shouldering different risks, and all 
of them deserve payment for their work.  The overall ticket price to a live 
performance or a sporting event includes components that ultimately flow to 
the artist or athlete, her agent, the promoter, the venue, the ticket sales 
company, various insurance and bonding companies, and others.68  Each of 
these participants facilitates the staging of the event and, while it is certainly 
fair to question whether some of these parties are overpaid relative to their 
contribution, each deserves to be compensated.  These parties are in the 
business of providing particular goods or services, they know the costs and 
risks that their roles present, and they price their products and labor 
accordingly.  Of course, different participants have different leverage in 
pricing their services: The headliner is a one-of-a-kind act who may succeed 
 
 67. It is important here to distinguish between the owner of the ticket and the agent who 
facilitates the sale of that ticket.  Scalpers (and initial ticket purchasers) actually take more risk than 
real estate agents, since most scalpers buy and own tickets that they may be unable to resell at a 
profit.  They must lay out the purchase price in advance with no assurance that they will recoup their 
investment.  StubHub, by contrast, receives commissions from both the buyer and the seller but 
never takes the risk of owning the commodity.  See Buyer Q and A, STUBHUB, 
https://www.stubhub.com/help/ (follow “See all help topics…” hyperlink; then follow “Buying 
tickets” hyperlink; then follow “Buyer Q and A” hyperlink; then follow “Where do these tickets 
come from?” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 6, 2014) (“StubHub is a marketplace, which means  we 
give people a safe, convenient place to buy and sell tickets.  We don’t buy or sell the tickets you 
purchase on our site.”).  StubHub, of course, has higher overhead costs than traditional scalpers and 
also provides certain warranties of authenticity to its customers.  See The StubHub FanProtectTM 
Guarantee, STUBHUB, https://www.stubhub.com/guarantee/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2014). 
 68. See, e.g., Marie Connolly & Alan B. Krueger, Rockonomics: The Economics of Popular 
Music 5–7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11282, 2005), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=711924. 
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in obtaining an astronomical appearance fee, while the roadie may be 
working for union scale.  But each of these contributors to the final product 
is likely to be a repeat player who develops experience over time and can 
decide whether to continue to play that role or to exit the market.  In settings 
where underpriced tickets are resold for a profit, the scalper and any 
intermediaries are among the many market participants commanding—and 
earning—fees for their services.69 
Can the same industry knowledge be attributed to the ultimate ticket 
purchaser?  Consumers who purchase event tickets, whether or not they are 
the original buyers, often are the least knowledgeable parties involved in the 
process of staging an event.  For this reason, consumers may merit some 
form of legal or contractual protection.70  Of course, different consumers are 
situated differently, and the long-time holder of a luxury box at Madison 
Square Garden probably has more market clout than the minimum-wage 
worker who pops her popcorn.  Consumers also develop expertise over time, 
and it would be misguided to treat every ticket purchaser as a gull in need of 
protection.  Moreover, some initial purchasers are experienced scalpers who 
intend from the outset to resell their tickets at a profit.  But even if we 
assume that the typical purchaser of Hannah Montana tickets is relatively 
new to the world of concert-going and that consumers such as these need to 
be shielded from the various swindlers who might take advantage of them, 
the problem remains that there are different consumers involved in different 
parts of a ticket-resale transaction, and protecting the interests of one often 
impairs the interests of another. 
For example, when the first purchaser of a ticket sells it to a second 
buyer, the interests of these two consumers are almost completely in 
opposition.  One view of the ticket resale market is that the person who 
values the ticket most should enjoy the opportunity to attend the event.  If an 
actual attendee would willingly have sold the ticket to someone who wanted 
to attend but could not procure a ticket, then the actual attendee valued the 
resale proceeds more than the right to attend the event while the 
disappointed fan valued the ability to attend the event more than the true 
market price for the ticket, an outcome that economists view as inefficient.  
Under this view, scalping should be both legal and encouraged, and there 
should be a healthy market in ticket resales, nurtured by ticket 
 
 69. Id. at 25–29. 
 70. See infra Part IV. 
[Vol. 42: 1, 2014] Will Ticket Scalpers Meet the Same Fate As Spinal Tap Drummers? 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
21 
intermediaries.  The law should protect the first purchaser’s legal right to 
transfer her tickets, should encourage commerce in tickets, and should keep 
information and transaction costs low by reducing legal and practical 
impediments to ticket resales.  After all, “[i]f you buy a Honda, should 
Honda tell you where you should be able to resell your car?”71 
An opposing view is that ticket prices are too high, predatory market 
specialists are taking advantage of inexperienced spectators, and fans of 
modest means are being priced out of the market.  Under this view, those 
artists who are willing to accept lower appearance fees so that their less 
affluent enthusiasts can afford to attend should not be undercut by a resale 
market that ensures that many of the tickets end up in the hands of the 
highest bidder.  If this belief prevails, artists and venues, and perhaps state 
legislatures, must come up with market structures that prevent initial 
purchasers from reselling event tickets, particularly at a profit, and anti-
scalping prohibitions should be strictly enforced.72  Businesses located near 
venues may support these efforts, worrying that fans who pay top dollar for 
a ticket are less likely to indulge in dinner and drinks before the show or 
return for other events later on. 
Thus, any discussion of protecting “the consumer” must focus on 
precisely which consumer needs protecting.73  Are we more concerned about 
the lifelong fan dying to see Bruce Springsteen for the fortieth time, willing 
to pay whatever a ticket costs, but hampered by artificial resale restrictions 
 
 71. Bill Shaikin, Battle Between Angels, StubHub Picks Up Steam, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2013, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/apr/21/sports/la-sp-0421-dodgers-angels-tickets-20130421 (quoting 
StubHub spokesman Glenn Lehrman) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Enmity between the Los 
Angeles Angels and StubHub ultimately led the Angels to instruct ESPN Radio not to sell airtime 
during Angels games to StubHub.  Bill Shaikin, Petco Park Changes Haven’t Helped Padres, L.A. 
TIMES, Apr. 27, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/apr/27/sports/la-sp-0428-down-the-line-
20130428 (concluding that “[t]he Angels have banished StubHub from their airwaves”). 
 72. At least one ticket intermediary follows this business model.  Scarlet Mist, an English online 
ticket exchange platform, bills itself as an “Ethical Ticket Exchange.”  See How It Works and Other 
FAQ, SCARLET MIST, http://www.scarletmist.com/index.php/info/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2014).  It does 
not charge a fee but does request donations.  Id.  And “[t]ickets change hands here at face value or 
less.  If you want to sell a ticket for more than that, please do not use our service.”  Id. 
 73. Individual patrons may fall into one category at one event and the other category at a 
different event, leading them to hold views on the issue that are inconsistent, if not hypocritical.  One 
regular event patron states, with no apparent irony, “If I have two Raiders tickets, that’s $150. . . .  
Those are my tickets and I should be able to do what I want.  But, I agree that when I want to buy 
concert tickets, people buy 25 tickets and they sell out quickly.  It drives up the price.”  Melody 
Gutierrez, Ticket Turf War Heats Up in Sacramento, CONSUMER FED’N CAL. (Apr. 9, 2013) (internal 
quotation marks omitted), http://consumercal.org/ticket-turf-war-heats-up-in-sacramento/. 
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imposed by the artist, the venue, the legislature, or Ticketmaster?  Or should 
we be more worried about the twelve-year-old girl hungering to see Justin 
Bieber but priced out of the market by wily scalpers who snap up most of the 
tickets the instant they go on sale? 
StubHub is more concerned with the Springsteen fan, though its motives 
are hardly altruistic.  As an entity that makes as much as twenty-five percent 
on every ticket resale,74 StubHub plainly profits most from a lively market in 
the resale of tickets.  Those who support a hearty resale market argue that 
the laws of supply and demand should rule the market and that any ticket 
purchaser should be free to resell her ticket for any reason at whatever price 
the market will bear.  They argue that a ticket is the property of the person 
who buys it and that any holder of a Honda should be free to alienate that 
Honda.75  To the artist who argues that she, rather than an intermediary, 
should be profiting fully from all ticket revenues, StubHub’s response 
presumably is, “Then set your initial prices higher!”  In a ticket world run by 
StubHub, tickets will always be available to the consumer who wants to buy 
them at the going price, but they will be expensive. 
Ticketmaster is more concerned with Justin Bieber’s young fans.  Its 
motives are a bit harder to discern, because it earns its commissions only on 
the initial ticket sale and might actually earn more if the initial price were 
higher.  Moreover, Ticketmaster has itself entered the resale market, 
acquiring TicketsNow as a resale agent.76  Ticketmaster claims to be 
 
 74. StubHub may charge a fifteen percent commission to the seller, see Selling Basics, 
STUBHUB, supra note 67 (follow “See all help topics…” hyperlink; then follow “Selling tickets” 
hyperlink; then follow “Selling basics” hyperlink; then follow “Selling fees” hyperlink) (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2014), and a commission of up to ten percent to the buyer, see Buying Basics, STUBHUB, 
supra note 67 (follow “See all help topics…” hyperlink; then follow “Buying tickets” hyperlink; 
then follow “Buying basics” hyperlink; then follow “Fees for buying tickets” hyperlink) (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2014). 
 75. See Shaikin, Battle Between Angels, StubHub Picks Up Steam, supra note 71.  “When fans 
buy tickets, we own them. . . . We have the right to buy, give away or sell our tickets however we 
choose, anytime we choose, in any way we choose, at any price we choose.”  About Us, FAN 
FREEDOM, http://www.fanfreedom.org/about-fan-freedom/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2014).  The webpage 
proceeds to note StubHub’s support for FanFreedom.  Id. 
 76. Ethan Smith, Ticketmaster Buys Major Reseller, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2008, http://online.wsj 
.com/articles/SB120036522352890281; see also When I Search for Tickets on Ticketmaster, I am 
Sometimes Offered the Option to Go to TicketsNow.  Why is This?, TICKETMASTER, 
https://ticketmasterus.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/1511 (last visited Oct. 7, 2014) (“These 
fan-friendly links between pages on Ticketmaster and TicketsNow give consumers the option to 
shop for resale tickets sold by fans and other sellers, without having to [worry] about the security of 
the transaction or the authenticity of the tickets.”).  Some critics have charged that Ticketmaster 
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protecting the sanctity of the market, ensuring that all tickets in the 
marketplace are legitimate and all buyers are shielded from fraud, 
counterfeiting, and shady resellers hoping to take advantage of novices.77  It 
also defends the interests of an artist such as Kid Rock, who seeks to ensure 
that his less well-heeled fans can obtain concert tickets at reasonable prices, 
and the venue, which wants attendees to have disposable cash left over and 
available for ancillary purchases at the event.  In short, Ticketmaster argues 
that a ticket is a mere license, that the transferability of licenses is subject to 
limitations under property and contract law, and that restrictions on many of 
the tickets it sells prevent initial purchasers from further transferring their 
very limited legal rights.  In a ticket world run by Ticketmaster, tickets will 
be cheaper, but they will be hard to obtain and even harder to divest. 
III. WHAT RIGHTS DOES A TICKET CREATE UNDER PROPERTY AND 
CONTRACT LAW, AND ARE THOSE RIGHTS TRANSFERRABLE? 
Part II viewed the ticket resale market through an economic lens.  Part 
III, by contrast, will establish the legal nature of the relationship between the 
party that sells an event ticket and the initial purchaser of that ticket.  Part III 
will also examine the restrictions these parties may place on the purchaser’s 
legal capacity to transfer her rights.  It turns out that the ticket holder obtains 
 
funnels some unsold tickets directly to TicketsNow without ever making them publicly available, 
thus allowing TicketsNow to garner the resale premium that Ticketmaster has criticized its 
competitor StubHub for earning.  See, e.g., Adam Satariano & Greg Bensinger, Springsteen Sellout 
Leads to Call for Probe of Ticketmaster, BLOOMBERG.COM (Feb. 4, 2009, 8:35 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ayD73kINfON4&refer=muse (“Fans 
who couldn’t buy tickets [through Ticketmaster] for the Springsteen shows in New York and New 
Jersey were instead steered to the reseller’s [TicketsNow’s] Web site, where prices were hundreds of 
dollars above face value.”). 
  With TicketsNow apparently struggling, Ticketmaster is beta-testing a new website, TM+, 
that combines ticket sales and resales in one location.  Introducing TM+, TICKETMASTER, 
http://www.ticketmaster.com/tmplus (last visited Oct. 7, 2014); Hannah Karp, Ticketmaster Wants in 
on the Scalping Act, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412 
7887323838204578654220372996886 (describing TM+ as “blurring the line” between primary and 
secondary ticket sales and predicting that it will encourage some artists to sell their tickets 
immediately on the secondary market and thereby reap higher profits at the expense of consumers); 
Steve Knopper, Inside Ticketmaster’s New Scalping Plan, ROLLING STONE, Sept. 13, 2013, 
http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/inside-ticketmasters-new-scalping-plan-20130913 (“Even 
anti-scalping artists see that the resale market, if it has to exist, might as well play out via 
Ticketmaster.”). 
 77. See When I Search for Tickets on Ticketmaster, I am Sometimes Offered the Option to Go to 
TicketsNow.  Why is This?, supra note 76. 
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fairly flimsy rights under both property and contract law, and the issuer often 
retains the legal right to revoke the ticket.  Restrictions on further transfers 
are legally permissible and frequently are incorporated into the legal 
relationship between the two parties. 
A. The Law of Property   
An event ticket is a revocable license under the law of property.  The 
ticket holder enjoys the right to temporary possession of space at the venue 
with the permission of the property owner.  As a licensee, the holder’s 
property rights are extremely limited: The license gives the holder the right 
not to be considered a trespasser while she occupies the space.  Moreover, 
she holds even this very limited right only until the property owner decides 
otherwise.78  One property treatise refers to licenses as “the least important 
of the rights in the land of another” and “elusive.”79  The legal term “license” 
is commonly modified by the adjective “mere.”80  In most circumstances, 
these mere licenses are revocable at the will of the licensor.81 
Licenses are to be distinguished from other more expansive property 
interests.82  At the far extreme of the ownership spectrum, the holder of a 
parcel in fee simple absolute has the most extensive property rights available 
under the common law and may occupy the property for any purpose and 
exclude all others.83  While a ticket to a concert or sporting event bears 
 
 78. JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 380 (3d 
ed. 1989) (noting that termination at the licensor’s will is the feature that distinguishes a license from 
an easement).  I am assuming that the issuer of the ticket is the owner of the property.  In the case of 
a performance, however, the issuer may be the owner, a promoter, or the company retained to market 
the tickets.  For purposes of this Article, this distinction usually will not matter: If the issuer of the 
ticket is not the owner of the venue, then it is presumably acting as the owner’s agent. 
 79. Id. at 379. 
 80. See, e.g., Boswell v. Barnum & Bailey, 185 S.W. 692, 692 (Tenn. 1916) (“[T]he right of the 
purchaser of a ticket to enter and remain at a theater, circus, race track, or private park is a mere 
revocable license.”).  
 81. HERBERT HOVENKAMP & SHELDON F. KURTZ, PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW 337 (6th ed. 
2005) (noting that licenses are also revocable at the will of the licensee). 
 82. See, e.g., id. (distinguishing licenses from easements). 
 83. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377–78 (1945) (describing the 
citizen’s conception of property rights as “vulgar and untechnical” and contrasting this inexpert view 
with the “more accurate sense [of] the group of rights inhering in the citizen’s relation to the 
physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it”). 
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almost no resemblance to this very expansive fee simple ownership,84 it is 
somewhat more similar to a leasehold.85  The ticket holder, like a tenant, is 
entitled to occupy space owned by another for a defined period of time.86 
Leases are distinguished from licenses primarily by the level of 
exclusivity of possession.87  Thus, a ticket reserving a specific seat might 
seem more lease-like than a general admission ticket.88  Nonetheless, both of 
these types of tickets are probably considered licenses, given that neither 
interest allows the holder to exclude the owner of the underlying premises.89  
Tenants, by contrast, can exclude their landlord in most instances.90  In fact, 
hotel occupants and dormitory residents, who hold broader property interests 
than baseball or Bonnaroo attendees, have been held not to be lessees.91  The 
short duration of possession granted by an event ticket—typically just a few 
hours—also suggests that it is a license rather than a lease.  Thus, while an 
event ticket displays characteristics of both a license and a lease, tickets are 
almost universally viewed as licenses.92 
What little doubt might remain about the property rights a ticket creates 
is usually resolved by the ticket itself.  For example, even if you hold season 
tickets to the New York Yankees, granting you the legal right to occupy the 
same seat on at least eighty-one different occasions over a six-month 
period—more total occupancy time than a weekly beach rental—the ticket to 
each game is a license that is “revocable at the sole and absolute discretion 
 
 84. Some arenas have sold personal seat licenses (PSLs) that afford holders first-priority rights to 
purchase tickets to certain events at the venue.  See, e.g., Rochelle Olson, Personal Seat Licenses 
Will Raise $100 Million for New Vikings Stadium, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), Feb. 8, 2014, 
http://www.startribune.com/politics/statelocal/244270481.html (“Of the 65,400 seats in the Vikings’ 
new stadium, 75 percent will require game-goers to purchase seat licenses before they buy 
tickets. . . .  Once paid, the license holder will retain seat rights throughout the team’s 30-year 
lease—provided they keep buying season tickets.”).  To the extent that PSLs create more expansive 
rights for their holders than mere licenses, these additional rights are most likely enforceable under 
contract law.  See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 85. See State Block, Inc. v. Poche, 444 So. 2d 680, 684 (La. Ct. App. 1984). 
 86. See HOVENKAMP & KURTZ, supra note 81, at 265. 
 87. See id. at 337. 
 88. See id. at 389 (observing that the resolution of this issue is fact-specific). 
 89. See id. at 337. 
 90. See id. (noting that the rights of a lessee are exclusive even as against the lessor). 
 91. CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 78, at 240 (distinguishing leases from licenses and citing 
cases, while conceding that some of these issues are not completely settled). 
 92. See, e.g., Soderholm v. Chi. Nat’l League Ball Club, Inc., 587 N.E.2d 517, 520 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1992) (holding that a season ticket is a revocable license). 
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of the Yankees, with or without cause,” and the Yankees “reserve the right at 
anytime [sic], and without prior notice, to modify, amend or supplement the 
terms and conditions of this License.”93  If the relationship the parties had 
created under property law were, in fact, a lease or something even more 
extensive, this ticket language could not transform that legal relationship 
into a revocable license.94  But given that the property holder’s interest 
already bears so many of the attributes of a license, this language resolves 
any lingering uncertainty and confirms the intent of the parties to create a 
revocable license.95  Case law dating back to the 1880s supports the view 
that an event ticket is a license.96 
Interests in property are generally freely transferable.97  In fact, the law 
protects the right to transfer property interests quite zealously, placing strict 
limits on restrictions on the alienability of land.98  The law of property has 
long rejected restrictions on the transferability of a fee simple interest as 
violations of public policy.99  This longstanding tenet quite properly views 
land as a limited natural resource that should be enjoyed by the party most 
willing to use it, and attempts by grantors or lenders to limit the power of 
current property owners to convey their property rights are strongly frowned 
upon.100 
 
 93. 2011 Ticket License Plan—Invoice Terms & Conditions, YANKEES.COM, 
http://newyork.yankees.mlb.com/nyy/ticketing/sth_terms_and_conditions.jsp (last visited Oct. 7, 
2014).  Note that this webpage includes information for the 2011 season; a search for more recent 
information suggests that it is available to prospective purchasers only by telephone or email inquiry.  
See 2013 Season Tickets, YANKEES.COM, http://newyork.yankees.mlb.com/nyy/ticketing/season_dep 
osit_faqs.jsp (last visited Oct. 7, 2014). 
 94. CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 78, at 240; cf. Garner v. Gerrish, 473 N.E.2d 223, 225 
(N.Y. 1984) (finding that a document denominated as a lease actually demonstrates more of the 
attributes of a life estate because of the legal relationship it creates). 
 95. The website of the New York Yankees agrees: “Payment by the Licensee to the Yankees for 
the Tickets constitutes Licensees [sic] acceptance of the License pursuant to the terms and conditions 
set forth in the Ticket Booklet and the terms and conditions set forth below.”  2011 Ticket License 
Plan—Invoice Terms & Conditions, YANKEES.COM, supra note 93. 
 96. See generally Anthony J. Dreyer & Mitchell P. Schwartz, Whose Game Is It Anyway: Sport 
Teams’ Right to Restrict (and Control) Ticket Resale, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 753, 766–68 (2007) (citing cases). 
 97. See GRANT S. NELSON ET AL., CONTEMPORARY PROPERTY 273 (4th ed. 2013). 
 98. See CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 78, at 84. 
 99. Id.  “[A] conveyance ‘to A and his heirs, provided he never sells, mortgages, or otherwise 
transfers the land’ is a direct restraint on alienation and hence void.”  Id. 
 100. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 41–42, 95 (8th ed. 2011).  While 
mortgage lenders may not prohibit the mortgagor from transferring the property, they can make the 
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This black-letter property rule is relaxed considerably in the case of 
leasehold interests.101  When property is leased, two different parties now 
have rights in that property: The tenant holds present possessory rights and 
the landlord holds a future interest in the nature of a reversion.102  When the 
term of the lease expires, the tenant’s possessory rights end and the landlord 
once again enjoys the same present possessory rights he held before the 
lease commenced.103  Unlike the seller of a fee simple, who plans to sever all 
ties to the property forever, the landlord will regain possession at the end of 
the lease term.  Thus, the landlord has a greater interest in limiting the 
tenant’s ability to transfer possessory rights by assignment of the lease or 
subletting of the premises.  The common law, therefore, is more receptive to 
the landlord’s desire to restrict subleases or assignments than it is to the 
former fee owner’s desire to control title after conveying the property in fee 
to someone else.104  While restrictions of this type constrain the use and 
productivity of a finite resource, the limitations on transfer are relatively 
short in duration, and the reasons for permitting them outweigh this 
concern.105 
Restrictions on subletting and assigning are both permissible and 
common.  Leases may prohibit subleases and assignments outright; they may 
condition them on landlord consent, with or without an agreement that the 
landlord must be reasonable in granting that consent; they may require the 
tenant to remit a portion of any rent premium that it receives to the landlord; 
and they even may permit the landlord to terminate the lease if the tenant 
requests permission to sublet or assign.  To the extent that a tenant hopes to 
 
debt due upon transfer.  This rule makes sense, given that the mortgagee’s decision to lend was 
based in part on the identity and creditworthiness of the mortgagor.  Thus, the mortgagor is free to 
transfer the property, but that transfer may accelerate the borrower’s obligation to repay the loan.  
See 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(b)(1) (2012) (“Notwithstanding any provision of the constitution or laws 
(including the judicial decisions) of any State to the contrary, a lender may . . . enter into or enforce a 
contract containing a due-on-sale clause with respect to a real property loan.”). 
 101. See NELSON, supra note 97, at 275. 
 102. See HOVENKAMP & KURTZ, supra note 81, at 266. 
 103. See id.   
 104. Former holders of a fee simple absolute can still exercise considerable control over the 
property.  Owners can transfer property in fee simple determinable or fee simple subject to condition 
subsequent, each of which can cause the new possessor of the property to lose possession to the 
original owner or its transferee upon breach of a stated condition.  See id. at 136–37.  Owners can 
also create a wide variety of limited consecutive interests by granting a life estate followed by a 
series of contingent remainders.  See id. at 130, 138. 
 105. See id. at 276. 
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profit by transferring her possessory rights to another party after the rental 
value of the property has increased, this last option allows the landlord to 
retain the entire rent premium by terminating the original lease and 
negotiating a new lease directly with the prospective occupant at the current 
market rate. 
The law is much more willing to allow restraints on alienation in the 
leasehold context for two reasons.  First, as just noted, the landlord holds a 
reversionary interest in the property and will retake possession of the 
property at the end of the lease term, unlike the fee simple seller that parts 
with all rights in the property forever.  The landlord thus has more reason 
than the seller to care about the future condition of the property and the 
identity of the occupant.  Second, at least in the case of an assignment, the 
landlord nearly always receives the periodic rent directly from the new 
occupant of the property and is concerned about the particular occupant’s 
ability to pay.  Even in the case of a sublease, the primary tenant’s ability to 
pay her rent to the landlord is likely to be impaired if she is not receiving the 
sublease rent from the subtenant.  The seller of a fee simple, by contrast, is 
normally paid in full at the time of the sale and need not worry any further 
about the credit of the buyer or any subsequent occupant.  To the extent that 
the seller provides purchase money financing to the buyer, the seller enjoys 
adequate remedies under mortgage law and typically insists on having the 
right to make that financing due immediately if the buyer resells the 
property.  This protects the first seller if the buyer resells to someone with 
poorer credit. 
For these reasons—particularly the first one—the law should be even 
more willing to allow licensors to place restrictions on the rights of licensees 
to transfer their property rights to third parties.106  This appears to be the 
 
 106. There are other reasons why the identity of a licensee may lead to restrictions on the 
transferability of a license, particularly when the licensor is a public entity.  For example, liquor 
licenses and gaming licenses ordinarily may not be transferred, and the purchaser of a tavern or 
casino must apply for a new license.  See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, CAL. DEP’T OF 
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL, http://www.abc.ca.gov/questions/transfers_faq.html#Q. 24. (last 
visited Oct. 7, 2014).  In instances such as these, the licensor’s concerns are not only the identity of 
the transferee and the ability of that transferee to meet its obligations, but also the suitability of the 
transferee as a license holder and the capacity of that transferee to secure a new license.  See, e.g., 
Mission Statement, CAL. DEP’T OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL, http://www.abc.ca.gov/ 
mission.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2014).  Of course, these types of licenses differ in significant ways 
from licenses permitting the occupancy of real property. 
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case, although case law on the issue is sparse.107  After all, a licensee’s rights 
are so limited that it is rarely worth the cost to any of the three parties to 
litigate this issue.108  But the licensor’s ability to limit sublicenses or 
assignments seems self-evident, given the fact that most licenses are 
completely revocable at the will of the licensor.  If the licensor nearly 
always has the right to terminate the license at any time and for any reason, 
there is little point in raising the issue of sublicensing or assignment: Even if 
the licensor has agreed to accept sublicensees, the licensor with objections to 
a new third-party occupant can always be rid of them by terminating the 
license immediately after the sublicense is effective. 
The reasons courts allow landlords to limit subletting and assigning 
apply even more strongly in the license context.  The owner’s possessory 
rights to the space are expansive—fee simple ownership minus a few 
hours—while the ticket holder’s rights are minimal and short-lived.  
Weighing against this concern is the law’s desire to avoid the waste of a 
limited resource, and restrictions on transferring event tickets might lead to 
tickets going unused.  On balance, the law seems to provide strong support 
for the licensor’s legal right to prohibit the licensee from transferring an 
event ticket, and the licensee’s rights are sufficiently transitory that the issue 
will rarely lead to litigation. 
To summarize, a ticket to an artistic performance or athletic event is 
almost certainly a license under the law of property.  The rights of a licensee 
are ephemeral.  The licensor can readily revoke these rights, and the worst 
outcome the revoking party may face is a requirement that it refund the 
ticket price.  Moreover, restrictions on the transfer of a licensee’s rights 
appear to be at least as enforceable as restrictions on the transfer of a 
tenant’s rights.  Event tickets commonly include unambiguous limitations of 
this type.  Thus, the holder of the typical event ticket probably has little or 
no right under the law of property to transfer that ticket to someone else. 
 
 107. See generally Dreyer & Schwartz, supra note 96, at 769–72 (discussing the validity of 
restrictions on resales). 
 108. For sources providing some support for the view that a licensor may revoke a ticket license, 
see NPS LLC v. StubHub, Inc., No. 06-4874-BLS1, 2009 WL 995483, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 
26, 2009) (denying StubHub’s motion for partial summary judgment and allowing a suit by the New 
England Patriots and the owners of Gillette Stadium—alleging the commission of several torts and 
unfair trade practices—to proceed), and Jeffrey R. Doty, Comment, Inducement or Solicitation?  
Competing Interpretations of the “Underlying Illegality” Test in the Wake of Roommates.com, 6 
WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 125, 136–39 (2010) (discussing the NPS case). 
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B. The Law of Contracts   
Event tickets also create rights in the holder under the law of 
contracts.109  The athlete or performer agrees to perform—often with many 
escape hatches110—and the holder of the ticket is entitled to attend the 
performance.111  Most contract rights, including the right of a ticket holder to 
enjoy the performance or athletic event for which she has purchased her 
ticket, are freely assignable.112  “In most cases, contractually acquired rights 
are fairly impersonal and ordinarily do not depend on the identity of the 
person who will receive the promised performance.”113  There is no 
particular form the assignment of a contractual right must take, as long as 
the intention is clear.114  The transfer of a ticket from the initial ticket holder 
to a subsequent holder, gratuitously or for consideration, would seem to 
transfer the holder’s rights effectively.115  While an assignment changes the 
counterparty’s obligations to a minimal extent—now she must perform for 
someone else—the law of contracts generally regards a change this trivial as 
 
 109. See, e.g., Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Tickets, 1 HARV. L. REV. 17, 23 (1887).  “It seems to be 
settled, therefore, that railroad tickets, like other kinds of tickets, are now recognized as contracts.”  
Id.  “A theatre ticket is a contract securing the right of admission to a place of amusement.”  Id. at 
24. 
 110. Events may be cancelled or rescheduled for any number of reasons without the performer 
breaching the contract.  Sporting events may be postponed due to inclement weather, while concerts 
may be rescheduled if the performer becomes ill.  Under the terms of the contract the parties have 
reached, these events ordinarily are not deemed to be breaches but usually entitle the ticket holder to 
attend the rescheduled event or to receive a refund.  In fact, the event may not be firmly scheduled at 
the time the ticket is sold, as, for instance, in the case of sporting events for which the start time is to 
be determined later by the television network broadcasting the event. 
  Once again, the performer herself is not likely to be the party that enters into a contract with 
the spectator.  Rather, the issuer may be a promoter or the venue itself, which in turn has contracted 
separately with the performer.  This distinction, while important for other purposes, should be 
immaterial to the discussion that follows. 
 111. Note that the ticket holder ordinarily purchases her ticket from a performance venue or from 
a ticketing company, such as Ticketmaster, rather than from the performer.  In these cases, the 
contractual obligor most likely will be that counterparty, rather than the performer.  The performer, 
in turn, is contractually obligated to the venue.  This distinction is important, but will rarely affect 
the contract law outcomes discussed here: The party seeking to limit the holder’s right to assign may 
be Ticketmaster, acting at the behest of the venue, rather than Miley Cyrus.  See BUDNICK & 
BARON, supra note 19, at 260. 
 112. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 682 (4th ed. 2004). 
 113. JEFF FERRIELL, UNDERSTANDING CONTRACTS § 19.02(A) (2d ed. 2009). 
 114. FARNSWORTH, supra note 112, at 687. 
 115. Id. (noting that “the transfer of a contract right extinguishes the assignor’s right to 
performance by the obligor and gives the assignee a right to that performance”). 
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immaterial unless the identity of the initial ticket holder is of sufficient 
importance to the performing party.116  It seems highly unlikely that a 
singer’s promise to perform a concert is materially changed if one ticket 
holder in the arena is substituted for another.117 
There are limits on the assignability of contract rights.118  In some cases, 
the assignability of a contract may be limited by statute or on public policy 
grounds.119  Many states limit the capacity of employees to assign their 
wages, for example, or of tort victims to assign the rights they have received 
under structured settlements.120  The assignability of other contracts may be 
restricted because an assignment places greater risk on the counterparty.121  
The classic example is insurance contracts, in which the insurer agrees to 
insure one party, who then seeks to assign the insurance contract to a second 
party who presents greater risks to the insurer.122 
Most importantly for present purposes, the contract parties can agree to 
limits on assignability.123  While provisions of this type unquestionably place 
restraints on alienation, which courts disfavor under the law of property, 
restrictions on the assignability of a contract are generally upheld.124  In 
these cases, the parties’ freedom of contract apparently trumps the property 
rule that disallows limits on transferability.125  Sometimes the parties make 
 
 116. Id. at 692–94. 
 117. The reverse, of course, is often not true.  If the performer is unable to perform and delegates 
his duty to a substitute, the ticket holder may legitimately claim that she is not receiving what she 
bargained for.  Understudies may sometimes fill in for lead performers in Broadway shows, but a 
ticket holder will likely be extremely dissatisfied if headliner Barry Manilow designates Ozzy 
Osbourne as a substitute performer by delegating his contractual obligations to Mr. Osbourne, or 
vice versa.  See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 630 (6th ed. 2009) 
(“A duty is non-delegable where performance by the delegate would vary materially from 
performance by the obligor.”); id. (“[I]f the contract is premised on the artistic skill or unique 
abilities of a party, the duties are not delegable.”); cf. Munchak Corp. v. Cunningham, 457 F.2d 721, 
725 (4th Cir. 1972) (holding that an NBA player was required to continue to perform after his team 
was sold, noting that “it is inconceivable that the rendition of services by a professional basketball 
player to a professional basketball club could be affected by the personalities of successive corporate 
owners”). 
 118. FARNSWORTH, supra note 112, at 691. 
 119. Id.  
 120. PERILLO, supra note 117, at 614–15. 
 121. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 112, at 691–92. 
 122. Id. at 694. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. at 694–95; PERILLO, supra note 117, at 615.  This is not a new rule.  See Beale, supra 
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any purported assignment absolutely void.126  If this is so, the ticket holder 
simply lacks the power to transfer her right to another.127  In other cases, the 
parties agree that any assignment is prohibited.128  Courts often treat this 
latter type of limitation as a contractual promise, the remedy for which is 
damages rather than specific performance.129  It is difficult to imagine what 
damages a performer suffers if one concert attendee is substituted for 
another, so a restriction of this weaker type is likely to impose little practical 
limitation on assignability.130  Moreover, generalized prohibitions on 
assignment may be construed to prohibit the delegation of duties but not the 
assignment of rights.131 
In short, contract rights such as those created by event tickets are freely 
assignable in most cases, but the parties may agree to place limits on the 
ticket holder’s right to assign.  These types of limitations are enforceable, 
although courts construe them strictly.  However, a carefully worded 
limitation on assignment may make any attempt to transfer the ticket legally 
ineffective.  Event tickets that include strong language making any effort to 
assign the ticket void would seem to bar transfers.  In these cases, contract 
law appears to afford the initial holder of the ticket little legal ability to 
transfer that ticket to someone else. 
 
note 109, at 27 (“The ticket is transferable as a contract, by the custom.  Tickets are often made to 
run to the bearer; but even without such words the ticket is generally transferable, unless it is in 
terms limited to the original holder.”). 
  Comedian Louis C.K. has taken steps to prevent the scalping of tickets to his shows, 
threatening to invalidate tickets that have been resold at a profit and refund the original price.  Dylan 
P. Gadino, Louis C.K. Addresses Ticket Scalpers: ‘It’s a Tremendous Risk’ (Exclusive), LAUGHSPIN 
(July 3, 2013, 12:35 PM), http://www.laughspin.com/2012/07/03/louis-c-k-addresses-ticket-scalpers-
its-a-tremendous-risk-exclusive/.  The comedian acknowledges that the practice is legal at many of 
the venues at which he performs.  Id.  “We’re not treating it as a crime or even a wrong-doing.  We 
are just competing with them [the scalpers], on behalf of my fans, to enforce the terms and 
conditions of our ticket sales and to keep the prices down.”  Id. 
 126. FARNSWORTH, supra note 112, at 694. 
 127. RICHARD A. LORD, 29 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 74:22 (4th ed. 2003) (“To be effective, 
the antiassignment clause should contain a specific prohibition on the power to make an assignment 
and specifically state that any attempted assignments will be void or invalid.”). 
 128. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 112, at 694. 
 129. Id. at 694–95; PERILLO, supra note 117, at 615–16. 
 130. PERILLO, supra note 117, at 615–16. 
 131. JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 920 (5th ed. 2011). 
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C. Harmonizing Property and Contract Law   
The fact that a ticket gives its issuer and its holder legal rights and 
remedies under both the law of property and the law of contracts is neither 
inconsistent nor unusual, even in cases where those two bodies of law are 
not entirely in accord with one another.  The two parties’ privileges and 
obligations under property law and contract law may complement each other 
without being entirely consistent.  For example, a property owner may be 
acting within her property rights when she asks a licensee to leave without 
cause, but she also may be breaching a contract with that occupant and thus 
required to refund the admission charge.132  In this case, the parties would 
have created a revocable license under property law, but would concurrently 
have agreed by contract that the licensor would not revoke that license in the 
absence of bad conduct by the licensee. 
The same phenomenon is seen in landlord-tenant law, where courts in 
recent decades have imported principles from the law of contracts to 
supplement strict common law property rules.  Leases have gradually 
evolved from pure conveyances under property law into an awkward hybrid 
of the law of property and the law of contracts.  Courts in many states have, 
for instance, found an implied warranty of habitability in residential leases, 
even though implied warranties of this type were not a feature of common 
law leases.133  Similarly, courts have long enforced real covenants against 
successor owners under property law, thereby allowing parcels of property 
to be bound by contractual rights that run with the land in accordance with 
property principles.134  In these settings, two neighboring property owners 
 
 132. See, e.g., Ticketmaster Purchase Policy, TICKETMASTER, http://www.ticketmaster.com/h/ 
purchase.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2014) (“A ticket is a revocable license and admission may be 
refused upon refunding the ticket’s face amount.”); Boswell v. Barnum & Bailey, 185 S.W. 692, 
692–93 (Tenn. 1916) (“If the license to enter be revoked by the proprietor and the ticket holder 
ejected without unnecessary force, the only remedy of the holder of the ticket is an action for breach 
of the contract, and his damages are limited to the price of the ticket and any expenses incident to the 
purchase of the ticket and attending the place of amusement.”); cf. HOVENKAMP & KURTZ, supra 
note 81, at 389 (discussing inconsistent judicial treatment of this issue). 
 133. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1076–77 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“In 
our judgment, the old no-repair rule cannot coexist with the obligations imposed on the landlord by a 
typical modern housing code, and must be abandoned in favor of an implied warranty of 
habitability.” (footnotes omitted)); Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 208 (Vt. 1984) (adopting the 
implied warranty of habitability while acknowledging that this doctrine is derived from contract 
law). 
 134. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Bell, 516 A.2d 1028 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (discussing when 
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may be bound to one another because prior owners of their respective lots 
entered into a contractual agreement decades earlier. 
What we see, then, is that under both property law and contract law 
default rules, license rights are readily assignable, but the original parties 
frequently agree to limit that assignability under one or both bodies of law.  
Because tickets to cultural and athletic events are classified as revocable 
licenses under property law, the licensor may revoke the ticket or may limit 
the holder’s legal capacity to assign her ticket to a third party without the 
consent of the licensor.  The rule under the law of contracts depends on the 
terms of the individual contract, but as just noted, event tickets may include 
muscular restrictions on transfer.  Thus, the result under contract law  
focuses on the particular terms of the contract in question but will often 
correspond to the rule under property law: A ticket holder cannot transfer a 
ticket without the issuer’s permission. 
IV. THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE MARKET AND THE ROLE OF THE 
GOVERNMENT 
Part II focused on the economics of the market in ticket sales and 
resales.  Part III discussed what an event ticket is, what legal rights a ticket 
creates, whether the first purchaser of a ticket can transfer it, and legal and 
practical limits on these transfer rights.  Part IV will examine the roles that 
private parties and the government can and should play in the market for 
event tickets. 
The private market—using the mechanism of common law rules—has 
largely answered the question of whom it will protect.  Event tickets are 
licenses under the law of property and contracts under contract law.  Parties 
to a license are free under property law to restrict the ability of the licensee 
to transfer her limited property rights to someone else; for that matter, the 
licensor may revoke the license entirely.  Parties to a contract are free to 
invalidate or restrict attempted transfers of the rights the contract creates.  
The issuer of an event ticket often restricts the transferability of the ticket in 
these ways.  There is little reason for the licensor not to take these 
precautions, since it is always free to waive these restrictions expressly or 
simply look the other way if a ticket holder violates them.  Thus, property 
law and contract law already supply a default rule—free transferability—
 
promises by one property owner are binding on successor owners). 
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along with straightforward ways for the parties to sidestep that default rule.  
Artists, sports teams, and venues frequently take advantage of their legal 
ability to prohibit or limit secondary market transfers of tickets by placing 
transferability restrictions on their websites and on the tickets themselves.  
Ticket issuers enjoy the legal capacity to limit ticket resales and commonly 
do so, subject only to the more practical question of how they will enforce 
these restrictions. 
That answers the transferability question legally but not economically or 
morally.  Part II described the economics of the ticket resale market and set 
forth the opposing positions that artists can adopt.  Some, such as Kid Rock, 
wish to limit resales strictly, with the goal of keeping list prices low and 
enabling fans of lesser means to attend concerts.  Others, such as the Rolling 
Stones, have set list prices extremely high in the belief that this will 
maximize their overall revenue while eradicating the resale market, even 
though this pricing strategy may limit attendance to only the most affluent 
enthusiasts.  Many others have set list prices lower than the market will bear 
seemingly without concern as to whether initial purchasers resell their 
tickets or not.  These artists are willing to accept less revenue than they 
might otherwise command while letting the marketplace determine precisely 
who attends and at what price.135  Economically, the inquiry becomes 
whether the act decides to keep prices affordable for all fans, even those who 
would willingly pay more; to reward the most loyal (and well off) fans who 
are willing to pay top dollar for tickets; or to refrain from weighing in on the 
question, perhaps because the artist simply does not care much one way or 
the other as long as there is a backside in every seat.  Morally, there is no 
correct answer to this question.  Different entertainers feel differently, and 
property and contract law allow them to respond however they choose, 
which they have done.136 
This divergence of opinion is not surprising and is displayed in other 
areas of the entertainment industry as well.  Some artists are notorious for 
 
 135. As previously discussed, some artists apparently enter this free marketplace themselves, 
obtaining tickets at the box office price and then scalping them and keeping the price differential.  
See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 136. While there may not be any morally correct answer to this question, it does strike me as 
troublesome that one ticketholder recently offered a ticket to see the Dalai Lama in Santa Clara, 
California, at a price of $2,370.  Dalai Lama Tickets, STUBHUB (Feb. 24, 2014) (screenshot) (on file 
with author).  StubHub apparently agrees, as a pop-up window on the page noted that, as this was a 
charitable event, StubHub was donating its commissions from the event.  Id. 
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policing fan recording of live events.  They may believe that bootleg 
recordings diminish sales of official ones and thus reduce overall royalty 
income to the performer.  Or they may favor the quality control that the 
studio setting provides, preferring to keep lower quality works out of 
circulation.137  These artists have the legal right to prevent fans from 
recording their shows, and some artists exercise that right zealously, though 
with considerably more difficulty in today’s world of smartphones and 
YouTube.  Frank Zappa went so far as to release official recordings of some 
popular concerts in a “Beat the Boots” series designed to compete with 
unauthorized sales by bootleggers.138  The first track on one of these albums, 
entitled “That Makes Me Mad (Live),” is an interview of the artist 
discussing bootlegging in which he complains that bootleggers have released 
live versions of new songs before he could release the studio version.139  
Other performers, such as the Grateful Dead and Phish, encourage and 
enable the practice of fan recordings, apparently believing that widespread 
trading and sharing of live recordings enhances the aura surrounding the 
band and intensifies fan loyalty.  Live recordings are widely available for 
streaming online, with the artists’ blessings, and live concerts regularly 
include designated taper sections.140  The answer to this question is a matter 
of personal preference.  Different approaches may suit different types of 
acts, and the law provides flexibility here.141 
The discussion above assumes that the power to determine the terms of 
the ticket resides exclusively with one of the parties, as it historically has.  
Although a ticket is a license and a contract, initial ticket purchasers have 
historically had no leverage in negotiating its terms: Artists and venues made 
 
 137. See FRASCOGNA, HOWELL & HETHERINGTON, supra note 45, at 59 (“An artist’s concert 
performance is one of the most crucial components of his or her career. . . . With so much riding on 
the success of the performance, it is critical that the performance be carefully planned from its 
inception until the final note is played.”). 
 138. See, e.g., FRANK ZAPPA, BEAT THE BOOTS: AS AN AM (LIVE) (Rhino Entertainment 1991), 
available at https://itunes.apple.com/us/album/beat-the-boots-as-an-am-live/id284982445 (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2014). 
 139. FRANK ZAPPA, That Makes Me Mad (Live), on BEAT THE BOOTS: AS AN AM (LIVE) (Rhino 
Entertainment 1991), available at https://itunes.apple.com/us/album/beat-the-boots-as-an-am-
live/id284982445 (last visited Nov. 26, 2014). 
 140. See Taping Policy, PHISH.COM, http://www.phish.com/faq/ (follow “Taping Policy” 
hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 9, 2014) (including a thorough discussion of the band’s taping policy). 
 141. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012) (prohibiting recording of a live musical performance 
without the performer’s consent). 
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tickets available to fans, and the fans could choose whether or not to 
purchase these tickets but could not alter their terms.142  Unless fan 
dissatisfaction became widespread and intense, there was little likelihood 
that artists and venues would modify the provisions of their licenses, and 
they generally did not do so.  The resale market, by contrast, creates a setting 
in which the two parties have more equal leverage.  It may be too late to 
renegotiate the terms of the license, but the price can rise or fall based on the 
desirability of the ticket, including its legal terms.143 
With the rapid recent growth of social media, fans now have quicker and 
more effective avenues for expressing their irritation with Ticketmaster and 
other initial sellers than they formerly had, exercising the “voice” option so 
clearly described by Albert O. Hirschman.144  This fan displeasure has 
become particularly intense in response to Ticketmaster’s introduction of 
paperless ticketing, which it recently renamed “Credit Card Entry.”145  In an 
effort to prevent unauthorized ticket resales (which, in the case of paperless 
ticketing, often means virtually any ticket resales), purchasers of paperless 
tickets do not receive a ticket.146  Rather, the purchaser must present both a 
photo identification card and the credit card used to purchase the tickets in 
order to gain entry to the venue.147  Some sports teams employ a variation of 
 
 142. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 598–600 (1991) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (discussing the weak bargaining position of most ticket purchasers). 
 143. Cf. David E. Harrington, Lessons from a Scalper, REGULATION, Spring 2009, at 16, 19, 
available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2009/2/v32n1-2.pdf 
(examining the resale market for tickets to an Ohio State-Penn State football game and concluding 
that “the secondary market for ticket sales appears to penalize sellers who set prices well above 
predicted prices by reducing the probability that they will find buyers for their tickets”). 
 144. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 30 (1970): 
[D]issatisfied consumers . . . , rather than just go over to the competition, can ‘kick up a 
fuss’ and thereby force improved quality or service upon delinquent management. . . . 
 . . . Voice is here defined as any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an 
objectionable state of affairs, whether through individual or collective petition to the 
management directly in charge, through appeal to a higher authority with the intention of 
forcing a change in management, or through various types of actions and protests, 
including those that are meant to mobilize public opinion. 
See generally GLENN REYNOLDS, AN ARMY OF DAVIDS (2006) (describing how recent changes in 
technology have empowered ordinary citizens). 
 145. See Ticketmaster Credit Card Entry, TICKETMASTER, http://www.ticketmaster.com/ 
creditcardentry (last visited Oct. 10, 2014). 
 146. Id. (follow “How does Credit Card Entry work” hyperlink) (“[T]he card you used to buy your 
ticket is your ticket.”). 
 147. Id. (follow “Why is Credit Card Entry the only option for some events, or some sections?” 
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paperless ticketing, perhaps out of concern that secondary market tickets to 
late-season games will sell below the box office list price, thereby 
undercutting the team’s own efforts to sell any remaining seats.148 
Public response to the inflexibility of paperless ticketing has been quite 
negative.149  Those fans whose plans change find that it is difficult to transfer 
their license, even at or below the initial price.150  All members of a ticketed 
group covered by a single credit-card transaction must enter the venue 
together, which means that early arrivals must either wait for their tardy 
friends or abandon them (unless the latecomer is the friend who charged the 
tickets!).151  Purchasers cannot give tickets as gifts, since the donee, by 
definition, is not the purchaser and will be unable to produce the required 
entry papers unless accompanied by the gift-giver.152  Fans may not use gift 
cards, nor may they use the virtual credit cards that card issuers have 
recently devised to reduce identity theft and allow consumers to impose 
limits on their own credit.153  If the original credit card is lost, entry to the 
event is likely to be delayed.154 
 
hyperlink) (“When Credit Card Entry is the only option it’s probably because the tickets are in high 
demand, and the artist, team, or venue wants true fans like you to get the seats you want at face value 
by eliminating unfair competition from professional scalpers.”) 
 148. See, e.g., Frederick Dreier, Instead of Tickets, Some Nets Fans Swipe a Card, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 11, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304441404579121940180619 
728?mod=wsj_valettop_email&mg=reno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle% 
2FSB10001424052702304441404579121940180619728.html%3Fmod%3Dwsj_valettop_email (de-
scribing the Brooklyn Nets’ ticketless system that includes a stored value component, demonstrating 
how it complies with New York state law, and noting that it includes a loyalty program and allows 
the team to track fans’ spending habits within the arena). 
 149. See, e.g., Lisa Bachelor, Radiohead Fans Frustrated by Ticketmaster’s Paperless System, 
GUARDIAN, Sept. 28, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/money/2012/sep/28/radiohead-fans-
frustrated-ticketmaster-paperless (“[S]ince shelling out for tickets, many Radiohead fans have found 
they are unable to go because of unexpected work or other commitments, and are unable to sell the 
tickets back to Ticketmaster, or give them to friends or family members.”). 
 150. See, e.g., id.; TICKETMASTER, supra note 145 (follow “What if I bought the tickets but I’m 
not going to the event?” hyperlink) (setting forth Ticketmaster’s restrictive ticket transfer policy). 
 151. TICKETMASTER, supra note 145 (follow “I bought tickets for friends—can we get in 
separately?” hyperlink) (“If you bought for a group you gotta enter as a group . . . .”). 
 152. Id. (follow “What if I bought the tickets but I’m not going to the event?” hyperlink) (If you, 
the purchaser, are unable to transfer your ticket electronically via “Ticket Transfer,” “you may be 
able to walk your group to the entrance and show your credit card and ID to get them in.”). 
 153. Id. (follow “Can I buy tickets with a gift card or virtual credit card?” hyperlink) (“Sorry, you 
gotta use a credit card—the plastic kind . . . .”). 
 154. Id. (follow “What if I forget to bring the credit card I used to purchase?” hyperlink) (setting 
forth procedures for lost credit cards).  In some cases, the artist or team that opts for paperless 
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Paperless ticketing seems like a cumbersome approach, a throwback to 
the days when hard copies of credentials were necessary to establish one’s 
identity.155  Purchasers must present two physical documents that are 
supposedly unique in order to gain the admission for which they have 
already paid, which is one more than is required for entry to the secure area 
of a commercial airport.156  Ticket transfers, including gifts from non-
attendees, are impossible in many cases.157  In an era in which people pay 
bills, banks clear checks, and even the Internal Revenue Service accepts tax 
filings without any documents physically changing hands, the so-called 
paperless ticketing system seems like an idea that was obsolete long before it 
was developed.  Moreover, paperless ticketing leads to more empty seats, as 
initial purchasers whose plans change are stuck with their non-transferable 
licenses.158  Empty seats embarrass the performer or team, look bad to 
television viewers and those who attend the event, and deprive venues of 
opportunities to sell parking, merchandise, and concessions.159  Yet some top 
artists and events, including Miley Cyrus, Bruce Springsteen, Justin Bieber, 
 
ticketing may permit ticket transfers.  Id. (follow “Can I sell Credit Card Entry tickets?” hyperlink). 
 155. By way of comparison, note that Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code requires a 
holder in due course of a negotiable instrument to be in possession of the original document 
executed by its maker.  U.C.C. § 3-302(a) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Ann. Meetings) (stating 
that a “holder in due course” must be a “holder”).  Negotiation of an instrument requires physical 
delivery of the original.  Id. § 3-201(a) (“‘Negotiation’ means a transfer of possession . . . to a person 
who thereby becomes its holder.”).  This requirement, perhaps sensible and in accord with prevailing 
business practice when the UCC first was adopted, makes far less sense in today’s world of 
electronic transfers.  Lost original notes have caused huge headaches in recent years for lenders 
seeking to foreclose home mortgage loans.  See, e.g., Verizzo v. Bank of New York, 28 So. 3d 976, 
978 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that a bank’s loss of a promissory note created “a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether the Bank of New York owns and holds the note and has standing 
to foreclose the mortgage”). 
 156. Paperless ticketing requires production of the credit card used to purchase the ticket and a 
valid government-issued photo ID.  TICKETMASTER, supra note 145 (follow “How does Credit Card 
Entry work” hyperlink).  Processing through airport security requires presentation of a boarding pass 
and photo ID, but the boarding pass is not a unique, original document—in fact, the passenger can 
print numerous copies if she so desires. 
 157. Id. (follow “What if I bought the tickets but I’m not going to the event?” hyperlink) 
(allowing free transfers for some tickets). 
 158. See, e.g., Bachelor, supra note 149. 
 159. Eric Schroeder et al., A Brief Overview on Ticket Scalping Laws, Secondary Ticket Markets, 
and the StubHub Effect, 30 ENT. & SPORTS L. 1, 31 (Nov. 2012).  On the other hand, if initial 
purchasers are permitted to resell their tickets—perhaps at a loss, under these circumstances—those 
fans who paid full price will justifiably resent neighbors who obtained last-minute tickets at a steep 
discount and may hold the team and the venue responsible for this perceived unfairness.  Id. at 32. 
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and the NCAA Men’s Final Four, have insisted on using paperless tickets, 
and Ticketmaster has been more than happy to accommodate this desire.160 
Paperless ticketing is still too new for industry professionals to ascertain 
whether the initial consumer outrage will blow over, as it seems to have 
done for airline add-on fees such as checked-baggage charges.  
Alternatively, fan backlash might intensify and lead artists and ticket sellers 
to adjust or abandon this approach, as may yet happen with the excessive 
resort fees that continue to raise the ire of hotel guests.161  Consumers are 
recognizing yet again that Twitter and Facebook give them newfound power 
to object to the terms of one-sided licenses that might formerly have seemed 
non-negotiable.  While there still may be no direct negotiations between the 
ticket issuer and the first purchaser, issuers may modify their practices going 
forward in response to consumer criticism and revenue decreases. 
Fan dissatisfaction that is strong enough can also foster industry 
competition and catalyze changes in ticketing policies.  Promoters can take 
their business from a state that permits paperless ticketing to a neighboring 
state that strictly limits it.  Or new entities that provide more popular 
services can enter the market and, perhaps, succeed.  Given the number of 
large arenas over which Ticketmaster holds exclusive ticketing rights, it will 
be difficult for competition to arise in some segments of the entertainment 
market.162  At the same time, the ultimate monopolist in many of these 
transactions is the performer: 
There is only one Dave Matthews Band; there is only one 
Madonna—meaning that a promoter doesn’t have the option 
 
 160. Sonya Stinson, Paperless Ticket Trend Leaves Unbanked Outside the Gate, 
CREDITCARDS.COM (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/paperless-tickets-
unbanked-1273.php (listing some of the headliners switching to paperless ticketing, emphasizing 
that consumers who lack credit or debit cards are thereby excluded from attending, and noting 
opposition to the practice from groups including the National Consumers League and the American 
Antitrust Institute). 
 161. See, e.g., Christopher Elliott, Travelers Want ‘Resort’ Fees to Check Out—Permanently, 
USA TODAY, Jan. 13, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/hotels/2014/01/12/hotel-resort-
fee-service-charge/4441287/ (observing how individual hotel owners benefit from these fees at the 
expense of both guests and the hotel chains and noting the possibility of intervention by the Federal 
Trade Commission). 
 162. Albert A. Foer, Op-Ed., Who Owns My Ticket?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2013, at A27 
(“[R]estrictive paperless-ticket practices depart from bedrock market principles by unjustifiably 
limiting consumer choice and suppressing free competition.  They also might violate federal and 
state antitrust and consumer-protection laws.”). 
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between this Rolling Stones and that Rolling Stones.  If they want to 
promote a Stones concert, they have to deal with the one and only 
Rolling Stones.  The reality is not several Rolling Stones bidding 
against each other to secure a promoter.  As such, the artist, based 
on their guarantee and deal with the promoter, wields tremendous 
power over the ticket price.163 
Negative fan response to problems with the ticketing process has had 
another predictable consequence: the introduction of legislation that would 
regulate ticketing practices in various ways.  Proposed federal legislation, 
the Better Oversight of Secondary Sales and Accountability in Concert 
Ticketing Act of 2009—yes, the BOSS ACT—died in committee.164  New 
York became the first state to limit paperless ticketing, in 2010, while 
concurrently reaffirming previously enacted provisions repealing restrictions 
on scalping.165  The New York law confirms that a ticket is a license but also 
places limits on the ability of the ticket issuer to restrict the transfer of that 
license.166  The law prohibits the issuer from restricting sales of tickets that 
are part of a subscription or season ticket package or barring the initial or 
secondary market purchaser of any such ticket from attending the event.167  
 
 163. BUDNICK & BARON, supra note 19, at 195–96. 
 164. Better Oversight of Secondary Sales and Accountability in Concert Ticketing Act of 2009, 
H.R. 2669, 111th Cong. (2009), 2009 CONG US HR 2669 (Westlaw), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr2669ih/pdf/BILLS-111hr2669ih.pdf; see also Zachary 
H. Klein, Who’s the BOSS?  The Need for Regulation of the Ticketing Industry, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. 
FIN. & COM. L. 185 (2010) (discussing the BOSS ACT and underscoring the need for federal 
legislation to address improper behavior in the ticketing market).  Another federal bill, the “Ticket 
Act,” also died in committee.  Ticket Act, H.R. 4795, 111th Cong. (2010), 2009 CONG US HR 4795 
(Westlaw), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr4795ih/pdf/BILLS-111hr4795ih 
.pdf. 
 165. The New York law is found at N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 25.01–25.35 (McKinney, 
Westlaw through 2014 legislation) and is also available through the New York State Department of 
State, Division of Licensing Services website.  See Licensing of Ticket Resellers (Sept. 2014), N.Y. 
DEP’T ST., http://www.dos.ny.gov/licensing/lawbooks/TicketReseller.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 
2014).  The law was scheduled to sunset but has since been extended through May 14, 2015.  State 
Assemb. A8727A-2013, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2014), NY LEGIS LEG. MEMO 21 (2014) 
(Westlaw), available at http://open.nysenate.gov/legislation/bill/A8727A-2013. 
  For a thorough and fascinating discussion of the political compromises leading up to the New 
York law’s passage, see Bennett Liebman, Reselling Tickets in New York: 2010, N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N 
ENT., ARTS & SPORTS L. BLOG (July 13, 2010, 2:53 PM), http://nysbar.com/blogs/EASL/2010/07/ 
reselling_tickets_in_new_york.html. 
 166. ARTS & CULT. AFF. § 25.30(1) (Westlaw). 
 167. Id. § 25.30(1)(A)–(B).  This provision aims to prevent teams that issue season tickets from 
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In addition, the New York legislation prevents ticket issuers from selling 
tickets to secondary market resellers that they own or control.168  It prohibits 
purchasers from using “automated ticket purchasing software” designed to 
circumvent seller limits on ticket purchases.169  And while the New York law 
does not completely bar the use of paperless ticketing, it does require the 
issuer of the ticket to offer every purchaser the option of purchasing a 
ticket—paperless or otherwise—that is transferable without restriction or 
additional charge.170 
Two other states with huge sports and entertainment industries, 
Tennessee and California, have not yet succeeded in adopting legislation 
addressing these issues.  Interestingly, the bills introduced in these two states 
were in complete opposition to one another.  Yet in each case, strong 
lobbying by parties adverse to the bill defeated the proposal, at least for now. 
The “Fairness in Ticketing Act,” introduced in the Tennessee legislature 
in 2013 but not enacted, was relatively modest in its reach.171  The bill’s 
 
punishing holders who resell tickets to some of the games or the purchasers of those tickets.  See id.  
Note how the standard language on the website of the New York Yankees addressing the 
transferability of season tickets appears to conflict with this law.  See supra note 93 and 
accompanying text. 
 168. ARTS & CULT. AFF. § 25.30(3) (Westlaw). 
 169. Id. § 25.24(2).  This provision is aimed at “bots” that enable scalpers to flood ticketing 
websites with purchase requests as soon as tickets become available, thereby shutting out most 
consumers and cornering the market on tickets to that event.  See, e.g., Ben Sisario, Ticketmaster 
Accuses 21 of Fraudulent Ticket Buying, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2013, at B8 (describing suit by 
Ticketmaster against members of a ticket-buying ring that allegedly purchased as many as 200,000 
tickets per day ahead of the public).  Ticketmaster’s own website also prohibits the use of bots.  See 
Terms of Use, TICKETMASTER, http://www.ticketmaster.com/h/terms.html?tm_link=help_nav_5_ 
terms (last visited Oct. 10, 2014) (“[A]s a condition precedent [to using this site], you agree that you 
will not: . . . [u]se any automated software or computer system to search for, reserve, buy or 
otherwise obtain tickets . . . ; [or] [a]ccess, reload or refresh transactional event or ticketing pages, or 
make any other request to transactional servers, more than once during any three-second interval . . . 
.”); see also Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. RMG Techs., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1116–17 (C.D. Cal. 
2007) (granting Ticketmaster’s motion for preliminary injunction against a company that allegedly 
operated and sold bot software in violation of Ticketmaster’s terms of use). 
  Nonetheless, ticket scalpers have been quite creative in finding ways around these 
restrictions, including outsourcing to India the labor-intensive task of typing in the random distorted 
letters generated by some online ticketing software.  See Happel & Jennings, supra note 17, at 150 & 
n.108. 
 170. ARTS & CULT. AFF. § 25.30(1)(C) (Westlaw).  Some tickets are excepted from this 
requirement, including promotional tickets offered to members of certain groups, such as “persons 
with disabilities, students, religious or civic organizations, or persons demonstrating economic 
hardship.”  Id. § 25.30(2). 
 171. H.R. 1000, 108th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2013), 2013 TN H.B. 1000 (NS) 
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stated findings noted the prevalence of “bad actors in the ticket resale market 
who prey on fans of live entertainment”172 and claimed that the legislature 
needed to act “to ensure a free market for tickets whereby consumers know 
what they are buying, artists and teams have the ability to ensure that fans 
have access to great seats at fair prices, and deceptive, anonymous resale and 
deceptive Internet marketing practices are prohibited.”173 
The bill confirmed that tickets are revocable licenses valid for only a 
limited time.174  It would have required ticket brokers, as defined in the 
Act,175 to register with the state and to disclose to prospective purchasers 
“the difference between the face value of the ticket and the amount the ticket 
broker is charging the purchaser for such ticket.”176  Similar restrictions 
would have applied to “resale web sites.”177 
Without expressly mentioning paperless ticketing, language in the bill 
would apparently have permitted it: 
  To preserve the rights of consumers to secure tickets to 
entertainment events through safe and reliable means and to protect 
freedom of enterprise, nothing in this chapter shall prevent 
operators of places of entertainment, event presenters or their agents 
from utilizing any ticketing methods for the initial sale of tickets, 
through any medium, whether existing now or in the future.178 
The bill would not have prohibited the “resale or offering for resale of 
any ticket . . . in any area where such resale or offering for resale is 
authorized in writing by the organizer of the entertainment event, and the 
 
(Westlaw), available at http://www.capitol.tn.gov/Bills/108/Bill/HB1000.pdf.  For more on the 
legislative birth and death of this bill, see Bill Information for HB1000, TENN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, 
http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/BillInfo/Default.aspx?BillNumber=HB1000 (last visited Oct. 10, 
2014). 
 172. Tenn. H.R. 1000 § 62-45-102(2), 2013 TN H.B. 1000 (NS) (Westlaw). 
 173. Id. § 62-45-102(5). 
 174. Id. § 62-45-110. 
 175. Id. § 62-45-103(24). 
 176. Id. § 62-45-105(a)(3). 
 177. Id. § 62-45-106(a)–(b). 
 178. Id. § 62-45-107(2).  Tennessee law already prohibits the use of ticketing “bots” that allow 
resellers to “circumvent[] any security measures on the ticket seller's web site, circumvent[] any 
access control systems of the ticket seller’s web site, or circumvent[] any controls or measures that 
are instituted by the ticket seller on its web site to ensure an equitable ticket buying process.”  Tenn. 
Code Ann. § 39-17-1105 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Reg. Sess.) (effective July 1, 2008). 
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owner or operator of the place of entertainment where such contest or event 
is held.”179  While the implication of this language is that ticket resales—
including, perhaps, online transactions—are otherwise prohibited, no 
language elsewhere in the bill expressly prohibited other types of ticket 
resales.  Violations of the proposed law would have constituted a Class B 
misdemeanor.180  The bill died in April 2013 in the face of strong opposition 
by StubHub and others in the ticket resale industry, along with a broad range 
of concerned citizens and groups ranging from Change.org to the Tennessee 
Tea Party.181 
Ironically, an entirely divergent bill, aggressively supported by 
StubHub,182 failed in California at almost the exact same time in the face of 
strong lobbying by its opponents.183  As originally proposed, the California 
bill would have protected a far different group of consumers than those 
safeguarded under the failed Tennessee legislation.  Rather than demanding 
an affirmative writing before a ticket could be transferred, as the Tennessee 
proposal seemingly sought to require, the initial draft of the California 
legislation would have placed strong restrictions on the ability of the initial 
issuer of that license to limit its further transfer.  The California proposal 
would have made it unlawful to “[p]rohibit or restrict the resale or offering 
 
 179. Tenn. H.R. 1000 § 62-45-107(1), 2013 TN H.B. 1000 (NS) (Westlaw). 
 180. Id. § 62-45-108 (noting that such offenses are “punishable only by fine”). 
 181. Tom Humphrey, Fairness in Ticketing Act Proponents: Maybe Next Year, KNOXVILLE 
NEWS-SENTINEL KNOXBLOGS (Apr. 7, 2013), http://knoxblogs.com/humphreyhill/2013/04/07/fair 
ness_in_ticketing_act_prop/; Protect Tennessee Sports and Music Fans, CHANGE.ORG, 
http://www.change.org/petitions/protect-tennessee-sports-and-music-fans (last visited Oct. 10, 2014) 
(opposing Act; sponsored by StubHub affiliate Fan Freedom); Conservative Activists Join Fight 
Against Fairness in Ticketing Act, BUSINESSWIRE.COM (Mar. 24, 2013, 4:25 PM), 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20130324005026/en/Conservative-Activists-Join-Fight-
Fairness-Ticketing-Act#.VDjRN_ldXos (opposing Act; press release from Fan Freedom); Ken 
Marrero, TicketMaster and States are Stealing Your Property Rights, REDSTATE (Apr. 5, 2013, 
12:59 PM), http://www.redstate.com/blue_collar_muse/2013/04/05/ticketmaster-and-states-are-
stealing-your-property-rights/ (“This isn’t preventing scalping.  This is government picking and 
choosing winners in the market.”). 
 182. See Hannah Karp, Scalpers Beware: New Laws Redefine What Is a Ticket, WALL ST. J., Apr. 
26, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323551004578441132136821420. 
 183. State Assemb. 329, 2013 Leg., 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013), 2013 CA A.B. 329 (NS) 
(Westlaw) (version of Mar. 21, 2013), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-
14/bill/asm/ab_0301-0350/ab_329_bill_20130321_amended_asm_v98.pdf.  For more on the 
legislative history of this bill, see AB-329 Ticket Sellers: Equitable Online Ticket Buying Process: 
Sale or Use of Circumventing Software., CAL. LEGIS. INFO., http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov 
/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140AB329 (last visited Oct. 10, 2014), and Karp, supra 
note 182. 
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for resale” of event tickets;184 to “[p]urport to impose license or contractual 
terms” prohibiting the resale or limiting the resale price of the ticket;185 to 
require the initial purchaser “to agree not to resell the event ticket, or to 
resell the event ticket only through a specific means approved by the ticket 
issuer”;186 to bring certain legal actions based on unlawful prohibitions;187 to 
impose penalties on resales without the issuer’s permission;188 or to attempt 
to cap resale prices.189  Perhaps most notably, the bill would have expressly 
prohibited paperless ticketing.190  The original version of the California bill 
failed after intense lobbying on both sides.191  A vastly watered-down 
version of this legislation—one sentence in length—was ultimately signed 
into law.  This final iteration merely prevents the use or sale of sophisticated 
“bot” software to circumvent computerized limits on initial ticket sales.192 
V. WHAT HAPPENS NEXT? 
It is worth recapping the current state of the market in ticket sales and 
resales.  To begin with, an event ticket is a revocable license under the law 
 
 184. Cal. State Assemb. 329 § 22501(a)(1), 2013 CA A.B. 329 (NS) (Westlaw). 
 185. Id. § 22501(a)(2).  Note how this language addresses both the property law and contract law 
characteristics of the ticket. 
 186. Id. § 22501(a)(3). 
 187. Id. § 22501(a)(4). 
 188. Id. [sic]. Note that two consecutive subsections are numbered (4) and that this second 
subsection (4) should probably be numbered (5). 
 189. Id. § 22501(a)(6) [sic]. This subsection (6) should probably be numbered (7). 
 190. Id. § 22501(a)(5) [sic] (prohibiting technologies that would restrict ticket resales, including 
“issuing event tickets in an electronic form that is not readily transferrable to a subsequent purchaser 
or conditioning entry into the venue on presentation of a token, like the original purchaser’s credit 
card or state-issued identification card, that cannot be readily transferred to a subsequent 
purchaser”).  This subsection (5) should probably be numbered (6). 
 191. See Karp, supra note 182 (describing “an industry in turmoil,” a “philosophical debate over 
the question of ticket ‘ownership,’” and “dueling companies [that] have been at war since 2010”). 
 192. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22505.5 (West, Westlaw through 2013 portion of 2013–2014 
Legis. Sess.), available at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml;jsessionid=69ef 
f6fd253cc85459120c61e4c0?bill_id=201320140AB329&search_keywords=ticket.  This 2013 
version of the bill, which became effective on January 1, 2014, was amended and expanded 
modestly in July 2014.  State Assemb. 1832, 2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014), 2014 
Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 158 (A.B. 1832) (Westlaw), available at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces 
/billTextClient.xhtml;jsessionid=69eff6fd253cc85459120c61e4c0?bill_id=201320140AB1832&sear
ch_keywords=ticket (modestly expanding scope of statute to prevent use of bots to circumvent any 
security measures, not just those of Internet ticket sellers).  For a discussion of bots, see supra notes 
169, 178 and accompanying text. 
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of property and a contract under the law of contracts.  As licensors, ticket 
issuers are free under property law to revoke the license or to place extensive 
restrictions on the rights of their licensees to transfer ticket rights to third 
parties.  Similarly, ticket contracts can include prohibitions or restrictions on 
transfer and frequently do so.  Thus, the issuer of a ticket can and often does 
seek to prevent initial ticket purchasers from reselling their tickets under 
both property law and contract law. 
From an economic point of view, it is fair to ask why the secondary 
ticket market is as vast as it is.  Performers, promoters, and venues complain 
vociferously about ticket resellers earning money on ticket resales that the 
former parties believe is rightfully theirs.  The fact that initial purchasers are 
in a position to resell event tickets at a large profit plainly indicates that the 
initial ticket price is lower than purchasers are willing to pay.  Bruce 
Springsteen can almost completely destroy the market in scalped Bruce 
Springsteen tickets by raising the box office price for tickets, thereby 
shifting any profit to be made on the resale of underpriced tickets from ticket 
scalpers to himself.  Bruce might prefer to keep tickets affordable for the 
Rosalitas, Wendys, and Weak-Kneed Willies who are unwilling or unable to 
pay the equilibrium price, but his selflessness is no match for the vibrant 
market in resold tickets.193 
The growth of the Internet has made it possible for companies such as 
StubHub to accomplish easily what scores of on-site scalpers used to 
struggle to achieve with greater effort out on the sidewalk on the night of 
each performance.194  Potential buyers and sellers now have far more 
information than they had in the past, a convenient electronic meeting-place 
with relatively low transactions costs, and greater confidence in the smooth 
 
 193. The same rationale applies to sporting events.  Before Super Bowl XLVIII, the NFL decided 
that ticket prices at the box office would run as high as $2,600 and noted its interest “in capturing 
some of the value it has been yielding to fans and brokers who resell their tickets at a markup.”  
Matthew Futterman, NFL to Charge New York Prices, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2013,  
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324665604579079424146436620.html?mod=wsj_
valetbottom_email.  The article notes that of five hundred lottery winners who were able to purchase 
poor seats the prior year for $600, sixty percent resold the tickets within 24 hours, many for as much 
as $2,000.  Id. 
 194. Aditya Bhave & Eric Budish, Primary-Market Auctions for Event Tickets: Eliminating the 
Rents of “Bob the Broker” 6–7 (Univ. of Chi. Booth Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 13-36, 2013), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2237451 (attributing recent huge 
increases in secondary ticket sales to greater ease in purchasing primary sale tickets online, lower 
cost of reselling tickets online, and increased ease of skirting state anti-scalping laws). 
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and honest functioning of this online market.195  If Bruce sets his initial ticket 
price too low, buyers willing to pay the market rate can easily find willing 
sellers of tickets they purchased from the box office, with this market 
facilitated by an efficient electronic middleman.  The Rolling Stones seem to 
have thrown in the towel on this issue, intentionally pricing tickets 
extremely high in an effort to put scalpers out of business while maximizing 
their own take.  With revenues of $5.5 million per show on their most recent 
tour, they appear to have succeeded, even as they risked raising the ire of 
their fans. 
Consumers are relatively lacking in power in the market for tickets.  
Event tickets may be licenses and contracts, but they have never been 
negotiable on a case-by-case basis.  The growth of social media has 
increased the voice of consumers, however, allowing disgruntled fans to 
express their concerns and frustrations rapidly and effectively.  Whether this 
“union” of consumers is a match for the larger players in a very concentrated 
industry, including artists, ticket sellers such as Ticketmaster, and ticket 
resale clearinghouses such as StubHub, still remains to be seen. 
Meanwhile, legislatures are beginning to join the conversation amid 
heavy lobbying from powerful interests in the ticket marketplace.  Bills in 
Tennessee and California were stopped in their tracks for very different 
reasons in each state.  Future legislation, however, seems inevitable there 
and elsewhere. 
From a legal perspective, there is no correct answer to the question of 
whether or how the market in ticket sales and resales would benefit from 
regulation.  Consumers want free transferability and lower prices, but the 
more they get of one, the less they are likely to receive of the other.  Tickets 
to live events are a limited and highly desired commodity, and when box 
offices set initial sales prices too low, as they traditionally have, demand 
greatly exceeds supply.  Either a secondary market will develop, leading to 
higher prices, or that market will be squelched legally or technologically, 
resulting in limits on the ability of first purchasers to resell their tickets.  
Thus, for example, a state that prohibits the resale of tickets at a premium 
could attempt to enforce its scalping ban aggressively.196  Those who object 
 
 195. Id. 
 196. Bans on scalping are difficult to enforce.  One recent study empirically examined the prices 
of hockey tickets for seven NHL teams in four states that had recently repealed their anti-scalping 
laws, comparing resale prices before and after the repeal.  David E. Harrington, Uncapping Ticket 
Markets, REGULATION, Fall 2010, at 6, available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/ 
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either will violate the law and transact on the black market, perhaps by 
employing technological workarounds that make the law difficult to enforce, 
or will work to have the law changed. 
Nearly all parties in this marketplace are acting well within their rights 
under existing law—with a few obvious exceptions197—and some are 
lobbying for legislation that will advance their own interests still further.198  
Ticketing technology will continue to evolve, as it has been doing since the 
advent of computerized ticketing, and different groups of industry actors and 
consumers will seek passage of new laws that protect their own interests.  
For example, if some artists want to maintain low prices for their tickets 
while limiting the ability of initial purchasers to resell their tickets at a 
profit, it seems probable that the ticket market will develop technological 
solutions that are considerably more elegant than the current version of 
 
files/regulation/2010/10/regv33n3-6.pdf.  This study found no significant change in prices of resold 
tickets after the bans were lifted, suggesting that tickets were being resold illegally before the repeal, 
but did find an increase in the number of tickets available for resale.  Id. at 6 (“[I]f buyers and sellers 
ignore price ceilings because they are unenforceable, then repealing them should have no effect on 
prices at all.”). 
 197. There are at least three obvious exceptions to this general statement.  The first is the behavior 
of those ticket resellers who illegally employ computer programs to circumvent issuers’ preset limits 
on ticket sales, a practice that some states have already banned.  See supra notes 169, 178 and 
accompanying text.  Thus, the question with regard to this issue is not whether the practice should be 
prohibited, but rather how existing legal prohibitions can be enforced in light of current technology. 
  The second exception is the fact that some states still retain outright prohibitions on ticket 
scalping.  See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 5-63-201(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d 
Extraordinary Sess.) (prohibiting resales of tickets to “[a]ny music entertainment event at a greater 
price than that printed on the ticket or the box office sale price plus any reasonable charge for 
handling or credit card use, whichever is the greater”); McMillan v. Live Nation Entm’t, Inc., 401 
S.W.3d 473, 476 (Ark. 2012) (applying statute and noting, “[h]ere, the language employed by the 
General Assembly is so plain and unambiguous that judicial construction is limited to what was 
said”); Rachel A. Orr, Recent Developments, 65 ARK. L. REV. 517, 525–26 (2012) (discussing the 
case).  Note that tickets to events in Arkansas are available on StubHub, with some of them 
apparently being resold at a price in excess of the initial sale price.  See, e.g., Arkansas Razorbacks 
Football Tickets, STUBHUB, http://www.stubhub.com/arkansas-razorbacks-football-tickets/ (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2014). 
  Finally, the market in event promotion and ticket sales has become highly concentrated in 
recent years, raising questions as to whether parties such as Ticketmaster are violating antitrust laws.  
See Ben Sisario, Justice Dept. Clears Ticketmaster Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2010, at B4, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/26/business/26ticket.html?_r=0 (describing tough conditions 
Department of Justice imposed before it would allow Ticketmaster and Live Nation to merge).  But 
see BUDNICK & BARON, supra note 19, at 114–53 (discussing Pearl Jam’s unsuccessful earlier 
attempt to persuade Ticketmaster to reduce its ticket commissions). 
 198. See, e.g., Karp, supra note 182. 
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paperless ticketing. 
If any industry participant goes too far in protecting itself to the 
detriment of other participants, the harmed parties likely will respond by 
protecting themselves in some fashion.  State legislatures are likely to feel 
ongoing pressure from their constituents to act.  Consumers, who 
traditionally had the weakest bargaining position in the market for tickets, 
have found new strength in social media.  They have been aided by 
organizations such as Fan Freedom, which is partially funded by StubHub.  
In short, various interest groups in the ticket market have been using their 
influence to push for outcomes that will benefit themselves.  Legal and 
political institutions seem to be operating precisely as they should, and any 
temporary bad outcomes will presumably be resolved over time as the 
market and existing technologies continue to mature. 
The last question this Article will examine is whether there are 
additional ways to confront some of the issues discussed in the prior Parts, 
beyond the healthy interest group give-and-take just described.  It is likely 
that industry actors will continue to tinker with the standard form language 
in the ticket contract and that different groups will press to enact legislation 
that advances their interests at the expense of other groups’ interests.  But 
there are several other, more creative possibilities. 
One possibility is for venues to increase their use of the dynamic pricing 
systems that airlines currently employ.199  It is evident that commercial 
airlines in the United States have dramatically improved their ability to raise 
and lower ticket prices in the months and weeks before a flight to ensure that 
they sell the largest possible number of seats and earn the highest possible 
revenue.200  Few people view America’s commercial air carriers as models of 
consumer service.  But it is quite obvious that flights are fuller and prices 
have increased in recent years.  Airlines now can sell seats at the ever-
 
 199. See Ben Cohen, While Football Ticket Prices Soar, Auburn Struggles to Profit, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 11, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/while-football-ticket-prices-soar-auburn-struggles-to-
profit-1415750933 (highlighting the potentially huge profits Auburn University missed out on 
enjoying by selling football tickets at a flat price rather than a dynamic price); supra notes 58–65 
and accompanying text.  Airlines may soon carry dynamic pricing even further, tailoring fares to the 
specific passenger, including individualized knowledge about the particular consumer and his need 
to fly a given route at a given time.  Christopher Elliott, Custom Airfares: Pro-Passenger, or Pro-
Airline?, WASH. POST, July 3, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/travel/custom-
airfares-pro-passenger-or-pro-airline/2014/07/03/1af5f4aa-fe35-11e3-8176-
f2c941cf35f1_story.html. 
 200. See Elliott, supra note 199. 
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changing market price, and their customers continue to patronize them, 
however grudgingly. 
In fact, some sports teams have taken tentative steps in this direction.201  
Teams have always charged different prices for different seats based on seat 
location.  But more recently, some teams have begun to charge different 
prices for games on different days of the week or at different times of day, 
and also different prices for different opponents.202  Their goal is to charge 
the maximum amount for each seat that some consumer is willing to pay for 
that seat, and they are slowly discovering that each seat to each event is a 
unique commodity that may merit a unique price at each moment in time 
leading up to the event.203  Rather than worrying that the initial, permanently 
fixed price will prove to be too low, leading to foregone revenue, or too 
high, leading to empty seats, the ticket seller can tinker with the price as new 
information becomes available.204  Some fans may not like the price they end 
up paying, and holders of neighboring seats may end up shelling out 
dramatically different prices for their tickets, but each prospective attendee 
can develop his or her own unique purchase-timing strategy, just as many 
airline passengers do.205 
A related approach would be for venues to auction event tickets.206  
 
 201. See, e.g., D.R., Sports Ticketing: The Price is Right, ECONOMIST, Jan. 9, 2012, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/gametheory/2012/01/sports-ticketing (observing that Major 
League Baseball teams face high variation in demand from game to game because of a lengthy 
season, a small proportion of season ticket holders compared to other sports, relatively few sellouts, 
and variability in weather, and thus have been particularly eager to embrace dynamic pricing).  As of 
2012, more than half of Major League Baseball teams had adopted dynamic pricing, and these teams 
saw a 15% increase in full-price attendance and a 30% increase in overall ticket revenue.  Id. 
 202. Id.  One pair of researchers notes that, as game day approaches, dynamic ticket prices for 
baseball games can even reflect the popularity of the likely starting pitchers.  Bhave & Budish, supra 
note 194, at 25. 
 203. See, e.g., Jacob Goldstein, Baseball Teams Are Acting Like Airlines, NAT’L PUB. RADIO 
(Mar. 6, 2012, 9:17 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2012/03/05/147982995/at-the-ballpark-
ticket-prices-change-as-fast-as-the-weather. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See Patrick Dunne, Dynamic Pricing Trend Sweeps Across Major League Baseball, 
TICKETNEWS (Feb. 22, 2012, 11:05 AM), http://www.ticketnews.com/news/Dynamic-pricing-trend-
sweeps-across-Major-League-Baseball021222303 (quoting the President and Chief Operating 
Officer of the San Diego Padres as saying, “[o]ver time, as the game gets closer, ticket prices will 
normalize, but generally, fans who buy early will save money” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 206. See, e.g., Bhave & Budish, supra note 194, at 24 (concluding that greater use of auctions in 
the primary ticket market would nearly eliminate the profits to be made on ticket resales and thus 
greatly reduce scalping). 
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eBay, which owns StubHub, has been extremely successful in allowing its 
users to sell items in this way, and consumers have become more 
accustomed in recent years to the auction method of buying and selling 
various goods.207  Ticketmaster has already begun to dip its toe in these 
waters,208 and auctions are becoming more prevalent in other settings.  I 
recently checked in for a flight on Delta Air Lines only to discover that the 
flight was overbooked.  The check-in webpage contained a new question: 
Would I be willing to be rebooked on a specified later flight for (a) $25, (b) 
$50, (c) $75, (d) $100, or (e) “name your price”?  Rather than announcing a 
bump fee at the gate that might prove to be higher than the carrier needed to 
pay, the airline was seeking to ascertain the absolute lowest amount it could 
offer to bump the requisite number of people, determining by reverse 
auction the minimum premium it would have to pony up to deny a seat to a 
ticketed passenger.209  Airlines use similar auctions to issue upgrades to 
business class and first class seats.210 
Even before the advent of the Internet, some discount retailers employed 
similar methods.  Filene’s Basement discount stores, for instance, would 
publicize in advance the dates on which goods would be progressively 
marked down.211  Consumers would be forced to decide whether to pay the 
current sticker price, knowing exactly how much that price was scheduled to 
drop on specified future dates, or to wait in the hope that they could 
purchase the item for a lower price, with the risk that the item would be gone 
by then.212 
 
 207. My own law school, like many others, uses an online auction system for allocating seats in 
courses with limited enrollment.  Students are assigned a fixed number of points, which they use to 
bid for places in popular classes.  Our Office of Student Affairs and Records provides historical data 
on the number of points that were necessary to gain entry to each oversubscribed course in recent 
years. 
 208. See Ticketmaster Auctions, TICKETMASTER, http://www.ticketmaster.com/ticketauctions (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2014). 
 209. See G.F., Oversold Flights: How Low Can You Go?, ECONOMIST, Jan. 10, 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/gulliver/2011/01/oversold_flights#. 
 210. Daisy Carrington, Place Your Bids for Business Class: Airline Upgrades Now Up for 
Auction, CNN.COM (Sept. 3, 2013, 11:35 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/03/travel/place-your-
bid-for-business-class/. 
 211. See Our Story, FILENE’S BASEMENT, www.filenesbasement.net/our_story.php (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2014). 
 212. Filene’s Basement was ultimately acquired by discount retailer Syms.  Television 
advertisements for Syms stores included founder Sy Syms stating that “[a]n educated consumer is 
our best customer.”  Stephen Miller, Remembrances: Sy Syms: 1926–2009: For an ‘Educated 
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One group of researchers has suggested that ticket sellers would benefit 
by selling relatively low-priced ticket options, which would afford the option 
holder the right, but not the obligation, to purchase tickets later at a pre-
established price.213  Their work demonstrates that the use of options both 
increases the total revenues that an event organizer can earn and reduces 
secondary ticket sales.214  In addition, because purchasers of options can 
initially lose only the smaller option price and not the larger retail price of 
the ticket, consumers object less to non-transferability when the issuer 
employs the option approach than they do when the issuer adopts paperless 
ticketing.215 
Another possibility is that, in an effort to circumvent current limits on 
the transferability of paperless tickets, StubHub or one of its competitors 
might reconstitute itself as a cooperative that is owned by its sellers and 
buyers.  Rather than individual consumers purchasing tickets in their own 
names and then reselling them to other individual consumers—a process that 
is severely hampered by current paperless ticketing rules—the buyer would 
designate StubHub as its representative to purchase event tickets on the 
buyer’s behalf.  If this initial buyer then wanted to resell tickets to a 
secondary buyer who is also a member of the StubHub cooperative, then the 
name of the owner would not change: StubHub would continue to own the 
tickets, but now on behalf of the secondary buyer.  The agent, StubHub, 
would now be acting on behalf of a new principal, who would transfer the 
resale price of the tickets to the former principal.216  A properly established 
 
Consumer,’ He Discounted Designer Suits, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2009, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB125859990358854959. 
 213. See Yao Cui, Izak Duenyas & Ozge Sahin, Should Event Organizers Prevent Resale of 
Tickets? 4 (Univ. of Mich. Ross. Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 1191, 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2280141&download=yes (observing that “the 
revenue gains from switching to selling options can be very significant for event capacity 
providers”).  United Airlines, for example, offers FareLock as a way for prospective passengers to 
pay a modest fee to lock in a flight itinerary for a short time at a fixed fare, with no obligation to 
purchase the itinerary.  FareLock, UNITED.COM, http://www.united.com/CMS/en-US/products/travel 
products/Pages/FareLock.aspx (last visited Nov. 10, 2014). 
 214. Cui, Duenyas & Sahin, supra note 213, at 25. 
 215. Id. 
 216. This process would be analogous in some ways to the mechanism currently in place for many 
home mortgage loans, known as the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, or MERS.  “MERS 
acts as mortgagee in the county land records for the lender and servicer.  Any loan—where MERS is 
the mortgagee—registered on the MERS® System is inoculated against future assignments because 
MERS remains the mortgagee no matter how many times servicing is traded.”  About Us, MERS, 
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cooperative might be able to circumvent restrictions on the transfer of 
paperless tickets.  Alternatively, StubHub might be designated as the trustee 
of a trust for the benefit of the initial ticket purchaser.  In this capacity, 
StubHub would be the legal owner of the tickets, acting on behalf of the 
individual beneficiary who first acquires the tickets.  If that beneficiary later 
wishes to transfer the tickets, it can designate a new beneficiary without 
changing legal ownership of the tickets. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although I am a regular ticket consumer with strong personal feelings 
about whether event tickets should be transferable and at what prices, my 
goal in this Article has not been to lobby for changes from which I might 
personally benefit.  Rather, my aim here has been to examine the market in 
ticket sales and resales, to describe the legal status of an event ticket, to 
discuss whether and how issuers may limit the transferability of tickets, to 
review some recent legislative efforts in this area of the law, and to suggest 
some other possible ways of addressing a conflict that is growing and 
evolving. 
As I have already noted, there is no inherently correct answer to these 
questions.  Assuming that the government enforces antitrust laws 
appropriately, it is entirely possible for the market to work out suitable 
solutions that will change as the ticketing industry continues to move 
forward.  These solutions will vary over time as the market develops and as 
industry players devise new technologies.  Concerned parties are always free 
to lobby their state legislatures to protect them appropriately, and different 
industry and consumer groups will press for and against these changes as 
their interests dictate.  These are not merely predictions or guesses but rather 
are a description of events that are already happening.  Similar behavior is 
likely to persist as this important and enduring segment of the entertainment 
marketplace matures further. 
The twentieth century witnessed the birth and death of the record store.  
But artists have been giving live performances and athletes have been 
competing in front of audiences since before recorded history.  That seems 
 
http://www.mersinc.org/about-us/about-us (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).  As of January 2014, MERS 
had registered over 81 million mortgages, including more than 26 million active mortgages.  Quick 
Facts (May 2014), MERS, http://www.mersinc.org/component/docman/doc_download/804-final-
quick-facts-comm-2014-05?Itemid= (last visited Oct. 10, 2014). 
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unlikely to change in the future.  The most significant open questions are 
who will be attending these events, how they will obtain their legal rights to 
attend, and how much will they have to pay for those rights. 
